Exploring the ‘magnetic pull’ of BRICS, this article analyses how the group’s evolving strategies have increased global demand for membership.
This article is part of the BRICS thought leadership series, published by APRI in collaboration with the University of Johannesburg. It explores key themes from the 16th BRICS Summit and the group's broader initiatives. The series is edited by Ada Mare, Bhaso Ndzendze, Serwah Prempeh.
Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East and Ukraine, shifts in the global economic order, and debates about the future of international institutions, BRICS has drawn increased global attention as a significant player in global governance. In August 2023, during South Africa's presidency, 40 countries expressed interest in joining BRICS, and 23 submitted formal applications. Continuing this trend, the 2024 BRICS Kazan summit marked a pivotal moment, bringing together heads of state from Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa with leaders from newly added countries – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates – as part of one institution. Even before fully acclimating these new members, BRICS saw 34 more countries express interest in joining. However, at the summit, only 13 countries were invited under a new partner category, leaving some aspirants disappointed.
Demand for BRICS is at an all-time high, symbolising broader realignments in international relations. Yet the key question remains: What is attracting countries to BRICS, and can the group sustain its appeal?
The politics behind the expanding membership of informal groups, particularly BRICS, remain underexplored. BRICS lacks the ‘compliance pull’ of formal organisations like the WTO, which incentivise participation through legal obligations and penalties for non-compliance. Instead, states are pursuing multi-alignment by joining informal groups to boost their strategic autonomy and reduce dependence on any single power. Other explanations for BRICS' appeal emphasise rising powers seeking status in an exclusive club with strong economic credentials and close ties to China and other markets. Traditional Western notions of soft power – focused on cultural influence, political ideals and diplomatic strategies – have limited relevance to BRICS, which operates through a form of multilateral, so-called compound soft power and by pooling decision-making.
These explanations alone do not account for BRICS’ ability to act as ‘a magnet’ attracting countries worldwide or the surge in demand for membership. Understanding BRICS’ appeal is crucial, as the group’s enlargement has significant implications for global governance. BRICS members are positioning themselves as key players in shaping new norms, institutions and ways of conducting international affairs. Moreover, as BRICS seeks to consolidate a global majority, it must design effective enlargement policies, as countries around the world weigh the benefits of joining.
To address this research gap, this article introduces the concept of the ‘magnetic pull’ of informal groups, focusing on BRICS and exploring why non-member states seek to join. By examining BRICS’ expansions in 2010 and 2023, as well as Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency, this study investigates how the group’s foundational ideas and outreach strategies have evolved and resonated with prospective members. It argues that the group’s initial appeal was based on its economic credentials and the broad promise of system reform. In recent years, however, the group has become more strategic and focused, systematically conducting outreach to attract potential members. South Africa’s advocacy to join the original BRIC group and then represent Africa within BRICS was pivotal in both expansions. However, the BRICS’ 2024 expansion has highlighted limits to the group’s appeal and challenges to internal cohesion.
To maintain its appeal and strengthen its relations with Africa, BRICS must enhance its enlargement policy, establish effective conflict management mechanisms and actively support climate initiatives.
This article introduces the concept of the ‘magnetic pull’ of informal groups to explain BRICS’ appeal to non-members. Unlike soft power, which leverages values as a source of attraction and prioritises value projection over uptake, the 'magnetic pull' is rooted in ideas about development and future positioning. It gains momentum through the proactive outreach efforts of member states. This ‘pull’ mechanism draws on Beland and Cox's 2016 study of ideas as ‘coalition magnets’, which explores how certain ideas gain traction and are promoted by policy entrepreneurs. They argue that ideas shape political power relations by acting as a ‘coalition magnet’ that draws in diverse individuals and groups. Policy entrepreneurs strategically use these ideas to frame interests, mobilise supporters and build coalitions. The success of an idea in coalition-building depends on its positive, emotional appeal (valence) and capacity for multiple interpretations (ambiguity).
Applying this framework to BRICS helps examine how and why the group attracts such a diverse array of nations, especially those seeking to reform traditional Western-dominated structures. We can expect BRICS’ ideas to function as coalition magnets if they exhibit both valence and ambiguity, are actively promoted by BRICS members and are embraced by prospective members.
This study draws on official BRICS documents, statements from prospective members and media reports to evaluate how the group's ideas and outreach have resonated with prospective members over time. The analysis covers the period from BRICS’ emergence as an independent body in 2009 to mid-November 2024, focusing on the first enlargement in 2010, when South Africa was invited, the second enlargement in 2023 and Russia’s 2024 BRICS presidency. It explores whether the idea of BRIC(S) serves as a coalition magnet and compares different enlargement phases.
The inaugural BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) summit in 2009 launched BRIC as an informal group of fast-growing, ideologically diverse economies with large populations. It outlined the key ideas BRIC would pursue: seeking a more multipolar and democratic order, advocating for practical reforms of global governance – specifically economic and financial infrastructure – and incrementally and proactively advancing cooperation while serving the common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries. The investment acronym BRIC carried inherent valence, associated with rising economies and growth. The group’s political mandate to diversify and reform the international system emphasised hope and change, though it gave no specific details as to how this would be accomplished.
Initially, BRIC had no formal plan for expansion or engagement with other emerging and developing countries. Although South Africa and Nigeria were often mentioned in the press as potential members, only South Africa joined. Nigeria, one of the ‘Next 11’ emerging economies, was discussed in the context of positioning sub-Saharan Africa as the ‘fifth BRIC’, but it was not actively campaigning for membership in 2010. At the time, it was more focused on internal challenges such as political instability and corruption, despite maintaining friendly relations with BRIC members. In contrast, South Africa successfully campaigned for inclusion, highlighting its role as Africa's political representative and a gateway to the continent's economic potential. The government, including the president, foreign and trade ministries, and business delegations, lobbied for membership and leveraged ties with BRIC through other rising power groups such as India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) and Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC).
South Africa’s Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane emphasised that, in contrast to the North's zero-sum perspective, BRIC nations sought to reshape global power and advocate for a more representative, fair and equitable system. Reflecting on the importance of emerging powers in the struggle against colonialism, with ties of solidarity and partnerships forged over decades, Nkoana-Mashabane viewed BRIC as a model for development cooperation in a South-South context. At the same time, BRIC’s appeal was also practical, offering opportunities for trade, investment, technology sharing and collaboration across in various sectors. Notably, BRIC-Africa trade increased nearly eightfold from 2000 to 2008. Trade Minister Rob Davies outlined three engagement pillars: reforming multilateral institutions, including coordination within WTO and G20; building South Africa's industrial base; and supporting Africa's development agenda.
Given South Africa’s relatively small population and economy, the country’s selection, announced without clear criteria or formal enlargement negotiations, raised questions about its fit. This suggested a geopolitical decision, rather than a purely economic one, was made to include an African representative. Since BRIC operates by consensus, all member states had to agree on inviting a new member. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov highlighted that South Africa’s inclusion as ‘a leading African state’ added ‘a truly global dimension’ to the group and noted that its collaboration with BRIC in the G20 had advanced international financial reforms. Ultimately, South Africa’s effective campaigning, rather than systematic outreach by BRIC members, secured its place in the group.
Second enlargement during South Africa’s presidency: extensive outreach
After South Africa joined BRIC, now BRICS, the group declared its openness to engaging with non-member countries, particularly emerging and developing nations, as well as international and regional organisations. Two years later, South Africa hosted a BRICS Outreach Dialogue with African leaders, bolstering its regional leadership. During China’s presidency in 2017, China expanded BRICS’ outreach through the BRICS Plus Initiative, which aimed to create a broader network of development partnerships. It organised the Dialogue of Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (EMDCs), inviting leaders from Egypt, Guinea, Mexico, Tajikistan and Thailand to join the summit and discuss global development, South-South cooperation and the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
South Africa’s 2018 BRICS presidency continued both the BRICS Africa Outreach – inviting Angola, Ethiopia, Gabon, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Togo, Uganda and Zambia – and the BRICS Plus outreach – inviting Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica and Turkey. These countries were selected for their leadership in regional and global organisations. However, outreach efforts slowed between 2019 to 2021 due to a lack of consensus on invitations and the pandemic.
BRICS Plus outreach efforts resumed during China’s 2022 BRICS presidency. China first held the BRICS Plus Dialogue at the foreign ministers’ level, involving Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand and the UAE. It then hosted a High-Level Dialogue on Global Development during the BRICS summit, attended by leaders from Algeria, Argentina, Cambodia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Senegal, Thailand and Uzbekistan. The summit declaration supported BRICS expansion talks and called for the development of guiding principles and criteria for new members.
Hosted by South Africa, the 2023 BRICS summit prioritised expansion. Although there were significant disagreements over membership criteria – such as whether to expand at all and what political and economic requirements should be imposed – consensus was ultimately reached. The criteria included alignment with BRICS' principles, strengthening the group, UN membership and support for multilateralism and global governance reform. Prospective members were required to commit to the SDGs, support an open multilateral trading system and advocate for greater representation of developing countries (including Brazil, India and South Africa), particularly in institutions like the UN Security Council. Additionally, they needed to be emerging or developing countries with regional and strategic global influence, diplomatic, friendly and substantial trade relations with BRICS, a strong economic standing and committed to only imposing sanctions authorised by the UN Security Council.
Only six countries were invited to join BRICS in 2023. Those selected were apparently chosen for their existing economic ties, energy resources and interest in financial coordination, including efforts toward de-dollarisation. Among these, the UAE and Egypt were already members of the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) and dialogue partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The UAE viewed BRICS in the context of forming blocs to face global challenges, enhancing its support for multilateralism and boosting trade relations with the Global South. Egypt previously participated in the 2017 China-led dialogue and saw BRICS membership as an opportunity for development, trade and investment. Facing high inflation and debt repayment issues, Egypt found BRICS' de-dollarisation agenda appealing and discussed using local currencies for commodities trade with China, India and Russia.
Iran applied for BRICS membership in 2022 after participating in the BRICS summit, with officials stating that membership would boost the economy, weaken sanctions, reduce dependence on the dollar and provide access to broader markets. Ethiopia applied in 2023, citing its status as a founding member of the African Union and its desire to align with BRICS for national interests. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed highlighted BRICS’ promotion of South-South cooperation, while experts noted Ethiopia’s deteriorating relations with Western powers amid civil war.
Overall, BRICS’ appeal, as perceived by new members, has been economically focused and has emphasised South-South cooperation. This did not significantly change between the first and second enlargements. Each new member has prioritised BRIC’s original ideas while interpreting them to fit their specific interests. However, while the group’s outreach during the second enlargement played a key role in increasing demand for membership, many countries that attended outreach events never applied to join the group.
The limits of BRICS’ magnetic pull are best illustrated by countries formally invited to join as full members, such as Argentina and Saudi Arabia, which have not proceeded with membership. Argentina’s new government rejected BRICS membership, questioning its economic benefits and ideological orientation. Saudi Arabia, initially eager to join to diversify its economy, is still considering membership nearly a year after its expected entry.
The integration of new countries into BRICS has been complex, leading Russia to announce a pause on further expansion. However, the 2024 Kazan Declaration introduced the BRICS Partner Country category without specifying criteria or naming individual partner states. It was reported that BRICS agreed to invite thirteen countries - Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Vietnam, Uganda and Uzbekistan. These countries cited various reasons for joining the group.
Indonesia views joining BRICS as ‘a manifestation of its independent-active foreign policy’ and a means to promote the interests of the Global South. Nigeria believes that ‘being multiple-aligned is in (its) best interest’. Vietnam seeks to diversify foreign relations and strengthen independence. Uganda values BRICS’ efforts to ‘alter the current international order, in which a few nations dominate the majority’. Bolivia sees BRICS’ alternative economic framework as potentially beneficial to its development goals, while Malaysia hopes that joining could secure trade deals or investments. Through BRICS, Belarus seeks a fairer world order, the right to define its development ideology independently and an end to domination by the collective West. Cuba regards BRICS as a ‘key player in global geopolitics and a beacon of hope for the countries of the South’. Finally, Turkey has an incentive to explore other economic platforms, given its stalled EU accession process.
Algeria, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have expressed mixed feelings about BRICS, making their invitations to join as partners somewhat unexpected. Algeria, in particular, extensively campaigned to join BRICS before the 2023 Johannesburg summit, perceiving it as an economic and political powerhouse consistent with its nonalignment stance. After its application was rejected in 2023, Algeria decided not to reapply. Similarly, Kazakhstan engaged with BRICS, with reports that President Tokayev had ‘received proposals’ for membership. However, before the 2024 summit, he announced that Kazakhstan would refrainfrom applying, favouring the UN as a universal and uncontested organisation. Uzbekistan also sent mixed signals about its interest. During the 2024 summit, it reportedly aimed to join the BRICS Investment Platform and sought partnership, yet post-summit reports indicated that membership was not on the agenda.
To prevent issues with hesitant new members, the Russian presidency chose not to name specific countries in the Kazan Declaration and planned to formalise their membership later. BRICS countries were also more selective this year, with Brazil vetoing Venezuela’s application over election concerns.
Recent expansions reveal important lessons about BRICS’ appeal and institutional growth:
As BRICS continues to evolve, it may take several steps to better manage its development and prospective members while strengthening its cooperation with Africa and the Global South:
In conclusion, BRICS' economic influence and push for systemic reforms have resonated strongly with non-Western countries. However, its ability to navigate internal tensions and define a clear path toward sustainable development will be key to sustaining its appeal, attracting new members and enhancing its global influence.
Mihaela Papa, PhD, is the Director of Research and Principal Research Scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies.
I would like to thank Ashutosh Patil and Ishaan Ajay for their excellent research assistance.
