Entscheidende Allianzen: Eine Bestandsaufnahme der Partnerschaften Afrikas mit europäischen Ländern im Bereich der Bodenschätze

Summary

Introduction

As set out in 2024’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), the European Union (EU) is seeking to reduce its dependence on a narrow set of critical minerals suppliers. In an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment, supply chain diversification has become central to the EU’s broader industrial competitiveness, green transition and digital transformation objectives. These priorities are reflected in the European Green Deal (2020), the Digital Decade (2021) and the Clean Industrial Deal (2023).

To meet its supply chain diversification objectives, the EU has initiated partnerships with five resource-rich sub-Saharan African countries: South Africa, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zambia and Namibia, complemented by strategic projects in South Africa and Zambia.¹ The EU has also adopted a Team Europe approach, intended to pool resources across the EU, its member states and financial institutions, supported by the Global Gateway, the EU’s flagship investment initiative in the Global South (Africa Policy Research Institute, [APRI], 2026).

The partnerships and strategic projects, which the EU framed as ‘mutually beneficial’, have attracted growing scrutiny (Furness & Keijzer, 2022; Karkare, 2025; Küblböck et al., 2025), leading the EU to reaffirm its support for Africa’s domestic value-addition ambitions at the 7th African Union (AU) - EU Summit held in Luanda on 24-25 November 2025. This commitment aligns with Africa’s own objective of prioritising refining and processing activities beyond raw material extraction, as reflected in the African Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS, 2025), a continental framework leveraging Africa’s mineral resources for industrialisation, energy security and climate resilience (APRI, 2026a).

Neither the EU nor individual member states alone can mobilise the scale of investment required to implement the EU’s objectives to diversify the mineral supply chain and meet its external commitments. Much depends, therefore, on the success of the Team Europe approach (Carry et al., 2025; Schulze, 2026). Member states’ bilateral partnerships have the potential to complement EU efforts by addressing geographic and thematic gaps and mobilising investment (Hool et al., 2024; Jackson et al., 2024). At the same time, when pursued in parallel to EU efforts, they risk reducing the clarity and coherence of the EU’s external offer (Keijzer et al., 2021). For African stakeholders, this risks creating transaction costs, reducing value addition and shaping mineral diplomacy in favour of actors offering more attractive terms (Karkare, 2025).

The extent to which European member states’ mineral strategies and partnerships support or undermine the EU’s supply chain diversification objectives remains unclear, as limited information is available about their content, intent or even their existence. Against this background, this policy brief examines whether EU member states’ Critical Raw Materials (CRM) strategies and partnerships with African countries are coherent with their objectives. Building on the accompanying systematic mapping of bilateral mineral partnerships between EU member states and African countries, the brief offers policy recommendations to strengthen the coherence and effectiveness of EU-Africa mineral diplomacy.

The brief is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the methodology; Section 3 examines EU countries’ domestic strategies and bilateral mineral partnerships; Section 4 discusses the dynamics and constraints of domestic strategies and bilateral partnerships; and Section 5 reflects on the EU’s external commitments. Section 6 concludes by making three recommendations for how Team Europe can be strengthened.

Mapping bilateral mineral partnerships: scope and method

This policy brief examines bilateral mineral partnerships between African countries and EU member states. Partnerships were included in this study if they explicitly referenced critical minerals as defined by the EU’s most recent list, instead of relying on the diverse mineral typologies of individual countries (European Commission, 2023).² Partnerships were also included if they did not specify the mineral covered. The analysis focuses strictly on bilateral partnerships signed by governments, ministries or national geological agencies. Consequently, projects implemented through Official Development Assistance (ODA) or multilateral efforts, such as the Global Gateway, were excluded.³ The compilation of the database was completed by February 2026. Partnerships agreed after this date were manually added. The time frame of the partnerships was not an exclusion criterion – partnerships signed at any point in time and identified through the search methodology were included in the database.

The initial scope of the research covered all 27 EU member states. This was narrowed to eight countries (Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and Germany) which had formalised at least one bilateral partnership with an African country in the critical mining or minerals sector through instruments such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), joint communiqués or cooperation agreements.⁴

The analysis draws on extensive online desk research, including search engines and government and ministry websites, to create a database of partnerships as defined above. The database contains the minerals covered, areas of cooperation and countries involved.⁵ The desk research was complemented by 17 semi-structured interviews with stakeholders from six countries: Austria, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, and with European think tanks, the European Parliament and the European Commission (see Annex for details).⁶ Interviewees were selected based on their expertise in national raw materials strategies and partnerships and through a snowball sampling method.

While this brief provides a timely and systematic mapping, it does not provide a comprehensive list of all bilateral partnerships between EU member states and African countries. This is due to three limitations. First, given the limited availability of publicly accessible official information on the partnerships, particularly the lack of full-text agreements, the brief relies on press releases, joint statements and news reports, which contain limited information on the details of the partnerships. Second, efforts to address data gaps through interviews proved challenging due to a limited number of responses to outreach. This was compounded by internal fragmentation, where different government agencies involved in critical mineral partnerships are not always aware of each other’s activities and lack transparency (Carry et al., 2025). Third, as critical minerals are a highly political topic, interviewees were often limited by confidentiality.

EU member states’ mineral strategies and partnerships

Diverging national priorities within a shared EU agenda

European countries’ CRM strategies are primarily driven by the need to secure diverse national, economic and industrial interests. How these countries define and prioritise minerals varies.

While many member states are still developing national CRM lists, countries such as Germany and France have already adopted broader definitions than those contained in the EU’s CRMA (Leichthammer, 2025). At the same time, national approaches remain closely embedded in shared European narratives that frame CRM policy through the lenses of competitiveness, supply security and geopolitical resilience. For example, the national strategies of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, which were formulated prior to the CRMA, reflect ideas that informed the act: domestic resilience and external diversification (Herdlitschka et al., 2026).

The analysis conducted for this brief shows that there is a divergence in strategic interests between European countries which have a higher endowment of natural resources and domestic mining expertise, and those more focused on international partnerships.

Finland, Spain, Austria, Sweden and Poland have significant raw material deposits that they aim to develop under the EU CRMA to reduce their dependence on imports (Lallana et al., 2023; Niiranen & Leväniemi, 2025; Reichhardt et al., 2022). As a result, they tend to place less emphasis on external supply partnerships, including those with African countries, in their national strategies (see Table 1).

By contrast, Germany, France and the Netherlands, which are also among the EU’s largest importers of raw materials, prioritise international partnerships, including those with African countries, to secure supply (Aerts et al., 2025; German Mineral Resources Agency [DERA], 2019; Schmid, 2021; Voita, 2024). More specifically, France and Germany, despite their own potential for battery-grade lithium extraction, have a strong focus on mineral partnerships. The Netherlands, as a key logistics hub channelling raw materials through intra-EU trade, is the EU’s largest importer of raw materials (Aerts et al., 2025; Interview 2).

In Italy, CRMs are not highly politicised (Interview 17). Nevertheless, the country considers cooperation with Africa to be a crucial element of its foreign strategy (see Section 4).

Table 1: Overview of European countries’ CRM strategies

As part of their raw materials policy, three of the eight countries studied in this brief – Germany, the Netherlands and France – have also set up institutional coordination structures. In Germany, the Inter-ministerial Committee on Raw Materials, chaired by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi⁷), was established in 2007 to facilitate domestic dialogue among seven ministries, as well as industry and research stakeholders (BMWi, 2010; Blumstein et al., 2017). With a view to securing raw material supply and advancing sustainable extraction, refining and circularity, both domestically and abroad, the Netherlands established the Materials Observatory (NMO) in 2022, and the Minister of Economic Affairs appointed its first Special Representative for the Raw Materials Strategy, Allard Castelein, in 2024 (EIT RawMaterials, 2025). Similarly, France’s 2022 Varin Report led to the appointment of the first inter-ministerial delegate, Benjamin Gallezot, responsible for supply security across domestic policy and external partnerships, including with African countries.

Overall, member states’ CRM strategies are broadly aligned with the EU CRMA in terms of overarching objectives but reflect different national priorities that influence the relative emphasis placed on domestic resource development and partnerships with African countries.

European bilateral partnerships with African countries

The analysis conducted for this brief identified 14 bilateral partnerships between European and African countries. Eight EU27 member states have established partnerships with African countries. Of 14 partnerships, 10 were formalised in or after 2024, following the introduction of the CRMA at the EU level. While the formulation of these bilateral partnerships was not directly driven by the CRMA, their proliferation in recent years reflects the growing politicisation and geo-economic importance of the critical minerals sector within European policymaking (Laurens, 2025).

European bilateral partnerships are entering an already crowded landscape in several African countries, where initiatives by other global actors, such as the UK, China, the United States (US), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), India and Indonesia, are already in place (Beuter et al., 2025). Most African countries targeted by European countries are simultaneously engaged with multiple external partners: Zambia (France and Finland) is involved in seven global partnerships,⁸ South Africa (the Netherlands, Poland and Germany) in 11,⁹ Nigeria (France) in seven,¹⁰ the DRC (Poland) in five,¹¹ Angola (France and Germany) in five,¹² and Morocco (Spain) in six¹³ . The overlapping presence of multiple partnerships in the same countries reflects both the strategic importance of the African raw material sector and the increasingly competitive and fragmented nature of global mineral diplomacy. However, their sole presence does not increase African bargaining power.

European bilateral mineral partnerships in Africa generally do not specify the minerals they cover, except for two cases: Nigeria-France, which focuses on copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt and rare earth elements (REEs); and Angola-Germany, which focuses on copper, manganese, nickel and vanadium.

Eight of the 14 partnerships in the APRI internal database focus on geological and scientific cooperation in exploration, while five prioritise training and capacity-building. Only four include activities related to investment promotion (Zambia-France, Libya-Italy, South Africa-Poland, Nigeria-France), while just one involves joint extraction and co-financing activities (Nigeria-France). Interest in establishing bilateral partnerships with an economic orientation beyond geological and scientific cooperation therefore appears limited, which suggests that African countries should temper expectations regarding the extent to which they will be able to partner with European countries in the mining and processing sectors.

The areas of cooperation are also well illustrated by the fact that seven partnerships have been signed by the geological survey agencies in respective countries (Zambia-Finland, Angola-France, Zambia-France, Rwanda-Poland, DRC-Poland, Botswana-Sweden, Angola-Germany) three by foreign ministers (Rwanda-Finland, South Africa-Netherlands, South Africa-Germany) and two at the presidential level (Nigeria-France, Morocco-Spain). One has been signed by the minister of trade and industry (Libya-Italy) while another has been signed between the minister of enterprises and the minister of industry and minerals (South Africa-Poland). In addition, all partnerships are in principle non-binding, meaning that European partners cannot be held accountable for their commitments.

Overall, European bilateral partnerships in Africa reflect the EU’s growing strategic interest in critical raw materials. However, their predominantly non-binding nature, limited focus on economic partnerships and emphasis on exploration and capacity-building suggest only an indirect alignment with the EU’s supply chain diversification objectives and the EU’s value addition commitments in African countries.

Dynamics and constraints of bilateral CRM partnerships

The complex web of European mineral initiatives

Based on the interviews, there is little evidence of direct competition among European countries. However, the coexistence of multiple bilateral partnerships, development cooperation instruments and EU-level strategic partnerships and projects creates overlap and fragmentation in Europe’s external mineral initiatives (Karkare, 2025; Van de Graaf & Díaz Gras, 2025).

The overlap is particularly visible where national minerals partnerships intersect with existing EU partnerships or the Global Gateway. In the Lobito Corridor, Global Gateway projects intersect with initiatives such as Italy’s Mattei Plan and German engagement. This indicates not competition, but a layered governance landscape of overlapping regional (EU-level) and national approaches.

Across member states, bilateral mineral partnerships are strongly intertwined with development cooperation, which often serves as the main operational entry point into the mining sector (Interviews 1, 2, 3, 4, 7).

Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), for instance, implements raw materials development projects across several African countries, including Mauritania, Ghana, Nigeria, the DRC, Namibia and Mozambique, and operates mining competence centres in Ghana and South Africa, reflecting a more direct linkage to industrial supply objectives than other countries (BMZ, 2024; Interviews 8, 9, 14). France’s Agence Française de Développement (AFD) focuses on extractive governance and transparency, particularly through partnerships aligned with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, in Senegal and the Republic of Congo (AFD, 2025; Interview 5). The Netherlands prioritises due diligence and responsible sourcing across multiple African producer countries, including the DRC, Zambia, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa and Tanzania.¹⁴ Italy’s Mattei Plan integrates infrastructure development, notably the Lobito Corridor, to facilitate mineral exports to Europe (Lunardini & Tshuma, 2026; Interview 17).¹⁵ Sweden and Finland, on the other hand, adopt a more ecosystem-oriented approach grounded in green-tech innovation and firm-level cooperation (The Nordic Africa Institute, 2025; Interviews 1, 5, 12, 13).

The extent of coordination between these overlapping initiatives remains unclear. Some evidence suggests emerging complementarity, where bilateral partnerships reinforce EU instruments. For example, Finland’s partnerships with Rwanda and Zambia and Poland’s engagement in Rwanda are both linked to the Global Gateway-funded PanAfGeo+ geological cooperation project. In addition, the development cooperation efforts of European countries can support both upstream exploration and governance and institutional capacity-building, paving the way for deeper engagement.

Fragmentation becomes more pronounced in domestic financing structures and in a low willingness to pool resources for cross-border mining projects (Leonard & Megson, 2026). Cases in point are the domestic funds established by Germany (EUR 1 billion), Italy (EUR 1 billion), and France (EUR 500 million), alongside the Netherlands (no public figures are available), to support raw material projects (French Government, 2022; Invest International, 2025; Pacheco, 2024). At the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi in May 2026, French President Macron announced EUR 23 billion in combined investments, including some directed at the critical mineral sector (Le Monde, 2026). The divergence of eligibility criteria and the relatively limited scale of national funds risk directing investment towards domestically prioritised minerals rather than EU-wide strategic bottlenecks through collective projects under the Global Gateway’s EUR 300 billion pledge (Leichthammer, 2025).

In the broader geopolitical context, overlapping initiatives and fragmentation reduce the EU’s ability to compete with other actors with more comprehensive and coordinated offers, particularly China, the US and the Gulf states (Goritz, 2024). China’s investments in African critical mineral projects were estimated at USD 8-10 billion in 2023 (Tucker, 2025). Although US investments in African critical minerals have so far remained below USD 300 million, Washington has pledged up to USD 30 billion for mineral projects across the Global South, signaling the potential for a significant expansion of its role (U.S. Mission to the African Union, 2026). Meanwhile, Gulf states announced 73 foreign direct investment (FDI) projects in Africa in 2023, with a combined value of approximately USD 53 billion (Wilson, 2024). In contrast to these comprehensive efforts, overlapping and fragmented European initiatives with limited or narrowly focused areas of cooperation weaken the EU’s collective ability to support value addition in the African mining sector and achieve the EU’s supply chain diversification objectives.

Limited industrial demand and private sector mobilization

Low domestic industrial demand, challenges in meeting environmental, social, and governance (ESG) criteria, and the lack of coordinated supply- and demand-side measures continue to constrain the feasibility of deeper economic partnerships with African countries (Interviews 1-4, 6-9, 12-15, 17). In particular, European countries appear cautious about deepening bilateral engagement in African mining jurisdictions, which limits their potential to contribute to value addition in the African mining sector. They tend, instead, to prioritise partnerships in jurisdictions with higher existing or assumed ESG standards and mining, refining and processing capacities (Interviews 2, 3, 8).

Limited refining and processing capacity in African countries (IEA, 2025) creates a mismatch with European industrial demand, which depends on access to critical minerals in industrial-grade processed forms rather than raw materials (Nolte, 2026). Developing, refining and processing capacity in African partner countries is capital-intensive and considered too risky by many European firms, which remain more focused on exporting machinery and technology than investing directly in mining and related infrastructure (Interview 8). As a result, European off-takers, including clean technology firms, cathode producers and battery manufacturers, continue to source from China, which offers cost competitiveness and established industrial infrastructure (Tagliapietra et al., 2025).

Uneven alignment between the ESG standards of European and African countries further complicates these dynamics (IEA, 2024; Neema, 2024). Concerns related to environmental protection, labour conditions and human rights abuses increase both reputational and financial risks for European firms and governments, making both up- and downstream investment politically sensitive (Interviews 2, 3, 7-9, 12-15). These actual and perceived risks limit deeper economic cooperation, not least because European buyers have shown limited willingness to absorb the higher costs associated with ESG-compliant mineral products (Acheampong & Logan, 2025).

European countries’ domestic strategies, domestic funds and bilateral partnerships show positive tendencies in private sector engagement. Those partnerships that involve an economic element – France-Nigeria, France-Zambia, Italy-Libya, and Poland-South Africa – aim to promote investment and facilitate cooperation between companies. While existing interventions remain largely focused on the supply side, when combined with demand-side approaches, they could spur necessary investment in the African mining sector. However, a lack of demand-side guarantees, like long-term offtake agreements, prevents the industry from engaging even in Global Gateway projects (Van Damme, 2026). As long as these demand-side incentives remain absent, European companies will have limited incentives and risk resilience to invest in African mining and processing projects, and African partners will receive fragmented, uncertain demand signals from Europe.

What current partnerships mean for EU-Africa mineral cooperation

Prospects for African industrialisation: risks and opportunities

Given that Africa accounts for a major share of global critical mineral extraction but continues to export most minerals in raw or semi-processed form, bilateral partnerships could offer a practical starting point to facilitate the EU’s offer to expand Africa’s refining and processing capacity (IEA 2025). Such efforts would align with the AGMS and respond to a growing trend of export restrictions, now enacted by at least 13 African countries,¹⁶ aimed at promoting local value addition and industrial development.

From an African perspective, partnerships can only be mutually beneficial if they support African ambitions to capture more value from mineral resources not only through refining and processing but also through broader economic integration. However, it is uncertain whether existing scientific, technological and geological collaboration will translate in the near term into substantial European investment in extraction, refining or broader regional value chain integration. Interview evidence suggests that, despite growing rhetorical support for stronger EU-Africa mineral cooperation, expectations for deeper economic partnerships remain limited. Reliance on non-binding EU and bilateral partnerships limits their effectiveness and lacks accountability mechanisms. Accordingly, partnerships remain constrained by global market dynamics and limited in their capacity to reshape supply chains. Although domestic initiatives such as France’s recent investment package (see Section 4.1) could begin to shift this dynamic, it remains unclear which parts of the value chain these investments will target and whether they will represent genuinely additional funding or partly substitute contributions to the Global Gateway. Whether these contribute to extraction or value addition, and whether they risk reinforcing debt through loans, remains to be seen.

Investments focused on raw material extraction and the promotion of regional value chains with the sole perspective of export risk reinforce existing asymmetries. Importantly, European engagement in the extractive sector will only generate broader economic benefits if embedded within coherent domestic and regional strategies, including in the context of local export bans. Even if refining and processing capacities are established locally with European investment, a continued focus on export-oriented extraction to Europe with limited local demand risks reinforcing enclave economies and Dutch disease effects¹⁷ (Lapeyronie & Szedlacsek, 2025; Reisinezhad, 2024). This means that even if partnerships promote local value addition, this does not necessarily translate to broader industrial or developmental gains for African countries.

In addition, establishing local refining and processing industries will not be equally viable across African countries, as competitiveness depends on infrastructure, energy supply, market access through offtake agreements and stable mineral inputs. Given the limited number of European firms with relevant operational capacity in African extractive sectors, EU-Africa cooperation is likely to produce uneven gains across countries, with limited positive effects on broader economic sovereignty.

Implications for Europe-Africa mineral diplomacy

These findings carry three important implications for Europe-Africa mineral diplomacy in an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment.

First, as international actors offer African countries more comprehensive packages (see Section 4), fragmented and limited European bilateral initiatives may struggle to attract the engagement of African stakeholders (Shiferaw & Di Ciommo, 2023). Germany’s geological partnership with Angola, for instance, faced difficulties gaining traction amid more competitive offers linked to the Lobito Corridor initiative, which are supported by the US, EU, Italy, the African Development Bank and the Africa Finance Corporation, among other international actors (Interview 15; Chabala, 2024).

Second, Europe-Africa critical mineral diplomacy risks becoming concentrated in a small number of market-liberalised ‘donor darling’ states that already attract substantial geopolitical interest for critical mineral sourcing (Attinasi et al., 2023; Müller, 2023). While such countries may offer lower investment risks, this approach could limit the EU’s strategic presence in less competitive markets and overlook opportunities to build longer-term partnerships in countries that are currently less crowded by international actors.

Third, African stakeholders perceive European investors as attributing disproportionately high levels of risk to African projects, particularly in comparison to alternative partners, such as Chinese and Indian firms (Logan & Acheampong, 2025). African stakeholders view Europeans as abstract and paternalistic, especially when it comes to their ‘value-based offer’, which stands in contrast to failures to support local value chains, increasing scepticism and diminishing African interest in collaborating with European partners (Veron, 2025).

Towards a coherent Europe-Africa mineral diplomacy

In a geopolitical context marked by growing competition over critical minerals, the current fragmentation, non-binding nature and limited focus on African value addition risk weakening both the EU’s diversification agenda and the credibility of its partnership offer by limiting the EU’s collective leverage in Africa (Waymel-Vieillefosse, 2026). The success of the Team Europe approach should therefore be judged not only by its contribution to European supply security, but also by the extent to which it supports African ambitions to move higher in value chains. To strengthen cooperation through a Team Europe approach, improve complementarities between national and EU-level instruments, and support the EU’s external commitments in partnership with African countries, three recommendations emerge.

Coordinate the European offer

Both member states and the EU as a bloc should move beyond high-level declarations to better and more transparently operationalised supply-and-demand interventions that link European industrial demand to African value chain development. To reduce fragmentation, member states should embed their comparative advantages within the Team Europe approach set out by the EU CRMA by forming flexible, issue-specific coalitions with complementary expertise to jointly structure public-private partnerships in the African mineral sector (Interviews 3, 6, 16).

Existing cooperation formats, such as the Joint Communiqué on Critical Raw Materials between France, Germany and Italy (IEA, 2025), already demonstrate the potential for greater coordination. However, they remain largely inward-looking. Domestic investment packages and funds, welcome signals of political commitment, should be integrated into the Global Gateway (which is designed precisely to serve this coordinating role) in order to form the basis of a coherent European offer.

Create credible demand

Domestic and EU frameworks currently focused on supply-side incentives should be complemented by more explicit demand-creation policies to incentivise upstream investment, including in African value chains (Klumpp et al., 2026). Pursuing the EU-selected strategic projects could facilitate long-term European offtake agreements and joint purchasing mechanisms at the EU level, ensuring predictable, long-term demand (Acheampong & Logan 2025; Leichthammer, 2025). In addition, price stabilisation instruments such as price floors could function as a transitional tool to help reduce commercial risks. This strategy was discussed by the EU and G7 countries in September 2025, and more recently at the Critical Minerals Ministerial Meeting between the EU, US and Japan in February 2026 (European Commission, 2026; Payne & Rajagopal, 2025).

EU industrial and green procurement policies could create demand for a circular economy and responsibly sourced and processed African raw materials, and encourage a doubling down on ESG standards, rather than their deregulation (Azevedo, 2026). These tools could help address the barriers associated with private sector engagement towards realising bilateral and EU-Africa mineral partnerships.

Focus resources where value addition is viable and mutually beneficial

In order to move from non-binding and dispersed bilateral partnerships and better support value addition in cooperation with African partners, EU efforts should concentrate on a limited number of priority countries and projects. These should build on existing EU-level partnerships and strategically identified projects, rather than further dispersing resources across overlapping initiatives. This approach would enable more focused engagement and increase the likelihood of delivering tangible outcomes that are aligned with African industrialisation objectives.

Annex

Endnotes

References

About the Author

Eszter Szedlacsek

Eszter Szedlacsek is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Eszter also brings extensive experience as a policy analyst and consultant, having contributed to applied research and policy design for international organizations, think tanks, and academic institutions.

This policy brief is funded by the Stiftung Mercator Foundation as part of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Africa-Europe Relations Project.