From minerals to influence: Resource-for-security deals reshaping power dynamics in Africa

Summary

Introduction

In response to shifting geopolitical dynamics and as a clear sign that governments are increasingly embedding minerals into their foreign policy, recent developments point to a resurgence of natural resources-for-security deals. The renewed interest in these deals stems from the growing recognition of certain natural resources, particularly minerals, as critical. These critical raw materials (CRMs) are indispensable for green energy technologies, artificial intelligence and military systems. National and regional frameworks, such as the 2023 EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the US Inflation Reduction Act, illustrate how these resources are influencing geopolitical and industrial policies and, in turn, reshaping global supply chains. 

Africa’s vast natural resources have long positioned the continent as a strategic hub, attracting both state and non-state actors seeking access through cooperation, deals and agreements. The importance of these resources extends beyond their sheer abundance: Africa holds significant deposits of CRMs that are both globally scarce and strategically vital. In a rapidly shifting multipolar world, this scarcity heightens Africa’s role as a key player in the geopolitics of the energy transition. At the same time, Africa’s mineral-rich areas sometimes overlap with its most fragile and conflict-prone regions, as in Sudan and the Great Lakes region. This overlap gives rise to transactional partnerships, where short-term security support is exchanged for long-term resource access. 

This paper argues that resources-for-security arrangements in Africa, which date back to the colonial and Cold War eras, are being reshaped by today’s geopolitical realignments and the global scramble for CRMs. To illustrate these dynamics, three case studies are examined: Russia, the US and China, each of which reflects distinct ways of linking security engagement with resource access. Russia trades military assistance, often through private military companies (PMCs), for mining rights and energy partnerships. The Trump administration pursues selective deals framed as peace-making while securing CRMs and countering China’s dominance. China, by contrast, offers infrastructure investments in exchange for long-term control over resource flows, expanding its influence in Africa’s economic spheres and leveraging security cooperation to advance its geostrategic ambitions. 

A brief history: the colonial and Cold War legacy

During the colonial period, European powers extracted African resources with little regard for existing local governance practices, local economic development or equitable resource sharing. Colonial administrations operated extractive economies in which raw materials, such as gold, rubber and oil, were shipped to European metropoles, leaving African colonies underdeveloped and politically fragmented. This economic legacy laid the foundation for post-independence resource dependency and external interference (Rodney, 1972). Even after African nations obtained independence, the African landscape continued to be shaped by outside influence. During the Cold War, a series of proxy wars and conflicts destabilised the continent and resulted in numerous resources-for-security pacts between African states and the US or the Soviet Union (USSR). 

In this post-independence period (1950-1980), rivalries between the US and the USSR fuelled a new era of strategic resources-for-security deals on the African continent. Both great powers propped up authoritarian regimes to secure geopolitical influence and access to natural resources. A notable example is the Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo – DRC), where support from the Nixon administration for President Mobutu Sese Seko was explicitly tied to the US containment strategy and access to strategic minerals (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Gulley, 2022). Particularly, cobalt, which was essential for aerospace and military applications, and uranium, which was vital for the US to build the first nuclear bomb and subsequent atomic weapons, gave Zaire geopolitical importance.¹

In return for US security arrangements – including arms transfers, intelligence collaboration, financial assistance and political legitimacy – Mobutu provided American companies privileged access to these resource concessions (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002; Bechtolsheimer, 2010). Because of Zaire’s strategic position, and to maintain access to the country’s CRMs, the US maintained a long-standing relationship with Mobutu, despite well-documented corruption and repression (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). This cooperation was emblematic of broader US policy in Africa during the Cold War, in which security and anti-communist credentials often outweighed human rights concerns or economic accountability (Bechtolsheimer, 2010).

To counter US influence in Africa, the USSR, through Soviet state-owned entities (Gleijeses, 2002), developed a similar relationship with the government in Angola. In return for supplying Angola’s People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government with military equipment, advisors and financial resources, the USSR gained exclusive access to Angola’s significant oil reserves and diamond mines, helping to fund both the Cold War and the protracted civil war in Angola (1975-2002). 

Recently, competition over Africa’s natural resources has crystallised around distinct playbooks such as Russia’s use of private military companies (PMCs), the US’ peace-brokering model – as illustrated by its recent engagement in the DRC – and China’s infrastructure-for-resources strategy. Together, they reveal not only rival economic ambitions but also competing visions of how to turn Africa’s resources into geopolitical leverage.

Russian private military companies and resources-for-security deals

Since 1989, traditional interstate wars in Africa have declined while intra-state conflicts involving interventions by external actors backing proxy forces, militias and PMCs have increased. This evolution is mirrored in some contemporary conflicts and forms of cooperation between African countries and external partners. This trend is illustrated by resources-for-security deals that increasingly involve non-state or quasi-state² actors, such as the Wagner group, operating outside formal state structures. 

Over the last 20 years, PMCs have emerged as central actors in armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. Often aligned with foreign governments, they provide security services in exchange for direct access to natural resources. They blur the line between public authority and private profit, raising important questions about accountability, sovereignty and the governance of extractive industries (Hoffman, 2007; Mazarr et al., 2019).

As African demand for weaponry has increased due to security-related factors such as terrorism, insurgencies and regional tensions, Russia’s military-technical cooperation has proliferated. This cooperation has two facets: an official one including arms deals, training of local military and security personnel and physical protection, and an unofficial one, often involving Russian-backed PMCs, aimed at accessing valuable natural resources. Since 2017, the now-restructured Wagner Group has become a major actor in countries such as the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mozambique and the Sahelian countries, providing security services in exchange for resource extraction rights and political influence.

In 2021, Mali was the latest country where the strategy of combining military support with the pursuit of mineral extraction by PMCs played out. The transitional government turned to Russian PMCs for security services, and in return, members of Wagner were granted access to gold mining concessions in the south of the country. However, the economic returns from these resources proved insufficient to cover the costs of military deployment. In 2024, Russia experienced setbacks, including the Tinzaouaten ambush in northern Mali in July, where Malian military forces and Russian troops were attacked by Tuareg separatist and jihadist groups. 

Russia’s influence and investment in Africa serve dual purposes: securing access to strategic minerals and creating a buffer against Western sanctions. Resources-for-security arrangements involving PMCs carry significant implications for African countries. While Russia may offer short-term gains in terms of regime security or battlefield support, it does not support long-term objectives, such as socio-economic conditions or political stability. The presence of PMCs has been associated with human rights violations, the suppression of civil liberties and the entrenchment of authoritarian governance structures (Spearin, 2011).

Furthermore, these deals give these countries an illusion of sovereign control over their natural resources. While African leaders may frame engagement with Russia as a demonstration of sovereignty and foreign policy diversification, these deals do not aim to improve the lives of African citizens.

Deal-making diplomacy: the US’s approach to strategic minerals

The agreement between the US and Ukraine illustrates the Trump administration’s deal-oriented approach to mineral diplomacy. It also serves as a model for subsequent arrangements, including the recent US-DRC-Rwanda cooperation framework.

On April 30, 2025, the US and Ukraine signed a deal to establish a joint investment fund for the reconstruction of Ukraine. Part of the fund’s capital will come from revenues generated by future natural resource extraction. In addition, the agreement stipulates that forthcoming US military aid to Ukraine – whether in the form of weapons, ammunition or training – will be treated as a contribution to the fund. The other security dimension of these agreements is linked to the fact that many of Ukraine’s most resource-rich areas are located in the eastern part of the country – territory that is currently under Russian control. Notably, two of Ukraine’s four known lithium deposits fall within the occupied zones. 

Similarly, the DRC, home to some of the world’s largest reserves of cobalt, copper, lithium, tin and tantalum, has recently sought closer ties with Washington. As in Ukraine, much of the DRC’s mineral wealth lies in territories plagued by armed conflict and violence. The M23 rebellion, allegedly backed by Rwanda, has captured significant portions of the mineral-rich eastern borderlands. President Félix Tshisekedi offered the US greater access to these strategic minerals in return for military support. A peace agreement brokered by the US between the DRC and Rwanda in June 2025 illustrates this resources-for-security deal, with Washington positioning itself as a mediator to end decades of instability in the region.

In this agreement, access to Congolese mineral supply chains is linked to a US commitment to provide security support, though the precise nature of that role remains unclear. The agreement does not place any binding security obligations on the US. Critics have highlighted the deal’s lack of detail – on both security and economic fronts – with the Trump administration showing, like in Ukraine, a strong interest in tapping into the DRC’s abundant mineral resources.

One of the central provisions of the US-DRC-Rwanda deal calls for the countries to work together on a framework for regional economic integration, thereby boosting trade and investment in critical minerals while improving transparency across the supply chain. The agreement also envisions closer cooperation between Kinshasa, Washington and American investors to establish ‘transparent, formalised end-to-end mineral chains’. However, skeptics argue that the agreement faces serious limits. The M23 movement was excluded from the talks and has not signed the agreement, while Kigali continues to deny any formal connection with the rebels, raising doubts about the durability of the settlement. In addition, responsibility for expanding US investment in mining and mineral processing in the DRC largely rests with private companies. Even with renewed political commitments from Washington, US firms have a limited appetite for the high risks associated with operating in such a challenging environment. Moreover, the risks of investing in the Congolese mining sector extend well beyond the conflict in the east. They also include deep-rooted structural issues ranging from weak governance and lack of accountability to entrenched corruption. 

As with Ukraine, the resources-for-security structure of the agreement reflects President Trump’s transactional³ approach to foreign policy, privileging direct exchanges over the use of soft power, diplomacy or long-term development support. The administration has shown limited interest in Africa, except where US strategic competition with China and access to critical minerals are at stake. In this context, Kinshasa appears to be leveraging US-China rivalry as a way to encourage US engagement.

China’s infrastructure-for-resources strategy

China has adopted an infrastructure-for-resources model, centred on large-scale infrastructure investments in exchange for long-term access to natural resources. This relationship is most visible in China’s extensive trade, infrastructure and resource projects under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), launched in 2000, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For 15 consecutive years, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner, providing substantial loans and aid. Though the sustainability of this debt and the terms of engagement are increasingly under scrutiny, this approach accelerates project delivery while securing resource flows for decades.

China’s approach to security cooperation ranges from peacekeeping deployments and military training programmes to private security firms and dual-use infrastructure. This represents one of the components of its broader infrastructure-for-resources strategy. Under the BRI, many projects are operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises, while it is often private security companies that ensure the safety of overseas personnel and protect investments in sometimes unstable regions. That said, China has expanded its security cooperation, with over 80% of Chinese peacekeepers deployed in Africa, especially in areas where it has commercial interests. These peacekeeping activities serve broader foreign policy goals of fostering stability, safeguarding investments (such as South Sudan’s oil sector) and gaining military experience.

Beijing has sought access and facilities along BRI routes, leveraging infrastructure investments to extend its military reach. The opening of China’s first overseas military installation in Djibouti in 2017 marked the start of this effort. Linked to the infrastructure-for-resources strategy is the potential to leverage dual-use infrastructure: ports, telecom networks and data centres built by Chinese companies often have clear military applications. Meanwhile, as China’s overseas commercial interests expand, so does its naval footprint: Chinese naval forces escort vessels in the Gulf of Aden – strategically located near the Persian Gulf, East Africa and the Mediterranean Sea. Joint training exercises with Russia and South Africa further highlight Beijing’s growing maritime security role. 

African governments, facing persistent infrastructure gaps and funding shortages, often see Chinese loans and projects as opportunities for growth and connectivity. Infrastructure-for-resources deals, typically free from political conditionalities linked to human rights or governance, are highly attractive. As a result, over the last two decades, China has come to dominate sectors such as mining. For example, it now holds stakes in 15 of 17 cobalt operations in the DRC. Many deals are tied to the BRI. Across the continent, Chinese-backed companies have built roads, ports, hydropower plants, industrial parks and railways – from Djibouti’s ports to Kenya’s rail system and mining concessions in the Sahel. Through these deals, China offers swift development gains in exchange for secure long-term access to resources, while avoiding military entanglements or governance conditions.

Conclusion

The strategic competition for Africa’s natural resources has evolved, yet the underlying logic – external control in exchange for security or infrastructure – remains deeply entrenched. From colonial extractive economies and Cold War resources-for-arms alliances to contemporary arrangements involving private military companies or infrastructure-for-resources deals, Africa has long been a stage for external actors seeking strategic and economic gains under the guise of security or development. Yet, external attention does not automatically translate into benefits. 

Today’s resurgence of natural resources-for-security deals reflects a broader structural shift in the global order. In an increasingly multipolar world, access to CRMs has become a new ‘currency’ of power, reshaping how states project influence and forge alliances. While African states are courted, as key providers of these strategic resources, they sometimes underestimate the strategic value of their mineral resources. 

Despite their differences in approach, Russia, the US and China follow a common logic which holds Africa’s CRMs at the centre of global competition. Understanding these evolving modalities is essential for diagnosing external influence and enabling African states to negotiate more equitable partnerships to support long-term development, industrialisation and stability. Whether these deals enable sustainable development or reinforce dependency depends on the strength of institutions, the capacity of governments to negotiate favourable agreements, regional coordination and transparency in minerals-related deals. Equally important is the willingness to reject agreements that compromise human rights, environmental standards or national sovereignty.

References

Endnotes

About the author

Dr. Amandine Gnanguênon

Amandine Gnanguênon is Senior Fellow and Head of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics Program. She holds a PhD in political science from the University Clermont Auvergne (France). Her areas of focus include regional integration, peace and security, governance, artificial intelligence (AI) and digitalization, and climate-related issues.

Marius Kretzschmar

Marius Kretzschmar is a Mercator Fellow of International Affairs where he analyses the relationship between climate change and geopolitical risks. He gained professional experience at the German Embassy in London, the European Commission and in management consulting. He holds a Master’s in International Political Economy from London.

This commentary is funded by the Stiftung Mercator Foundation as part of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Africa-Europe Relations Project.