Summary

Background

Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine has captured the current international political and economic landscape, presenting states with several multifaceted challenges – from urgent calls for military assistance in Ukraine and neighbouring countries to managing the longer-term impact of rising inflation, grain shortages and disrupted supply chains resulting from sanctions on Russia. States have been forced to consider which tools to deploy, such as defence alliances, bilateral diplomacy, international law and sanctions, when managing these challenges while pursuing strategic economic and political objectives at regional and international levels. One of the most prominent tools that states have deployed towards achieving these ends is multilateralism.

Historically, multilateralism, defined as the strategic cooperation of three or more states for the achievement of shared goals, has been used by Western nations for varying political and economic objectives. More recently, it has been adopted by developing countries to pursue the needs and aspirations of actors across the developing world and has thus evolved to suit the changing nature of the international landscape. While the war has not, in itself, driven this evolution, it provides a useful backdrop to elucidate how multilateralism is currently being employed by actors outside the West to achieve strategic objectives.

In light of the BRICS annual summit, 22-24 August 2023, and amidst Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) provides a timely example of multilateralism: It has evolved outside of the West as states use it to pursue strategic objectives centred around South-South cooperation and development, and it is a response to Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine at an international level. This multilateral objective is evidenced by past summit joint statements that affirm BRICS members’ commitment to strengthening multilateralism and working with multilateral bodies, such as the G20, to solve global challenges through economic cooperation. While this strengthening is in keeping with BRICS’ founding goal of leveraging South-South cooperation, the strong economic and political linkages of the European Union (EU) and BRICS blocs make it worth exploring EU-BRICS relations.

While the EU and BRICS may see themselves as competitors, and their divergent strategic cultures and operational codes could be the biggest obstacles to expanding and deepening their cooperation, these differences could be the basis of a common EU-BRICS strategy or framework. Neither side has expressed ambition or interest in engaging as a multilateral grouping nor do they have a multilateral strategy towards the other. Nonetheless, it would be wise for them, in particular for the EU, to consider how their relations could need a new ambition in light of the shifting geopolitical interdependencies and alliances between the EU and BRICS countries: rising tensions between China and Europe, Europe’s aspiration to reduce its economic dependency on China, increasing ties between India and the EU, the “revitalisation” of cooperation between Brazil-EU relations and the shifting paradigm and ties between the EU and its largest neighbour, Russia. Finally, Europe's diminishing share of the global population and economic power and the rapidly changing competitive international order mean that new multilateral cooperation holds immense value for EU member states and must be considered, even by the larger member states.

Thus, using EU-BRICS multilateral relations as a case study, this paper will answer a critical question hanging over international relations: what has changed or is changing in the practice of multilateralism, especially against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war? The paper will evidence the evolution of multilateralism as practised by both the EU and BRICS, specifically focusing on the challenge BRICS poses to multilateralism that has historically been defined and practised by Western states. The engagement, or lack thereof, between the EU and BRICS will be used to evidence and define this challenge as a structural disjuncture in how multilateralism exists in international politics and, more currently, amidst the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. The paper then considers key challenges and recommendations for a future BRICS’ policy agenda, such as membership expansion and contributions to the African Free Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). This concluding section notes how the BRICS summit under the South African Presidency is a critical platform to address challenges and pursue recommendations.

BRICS and the EU – two-faced multilateralism or structural disjuncture?

Both the EU and BRICS began in response to the economic needs and willingness of their respective member states. However, they differ vastly in their economic and political systems, priorities, values, interests, character and fundamental views of the international order and its future. Discrepancies in economic development and global influence also exist, as the EU wields significant economic and political power while the BRICS countries are emerging economies with limited effect on global governance. These distinctions in values, interests and influence impact the level of cooperation and power dynamics between the two groups, culminating in a structural disjuncture that cannot be ignored.

When considering the activities and status of rising economic powers outside its immediate sphere of influence, the EU has chosen largely to institutionalise and deepen bilateral political and economic relations with individual states. Its approach to BRICS is no different, with the EU Global Strategy outlining how the EU is seeking to establish “strategic partnerships” with BRICS member states, as evidenced in increasing bilateral trade and diplomatic exchange. Moreover, BRICS is challenging the EU's approach to global security and stability. The EU has traditionally relied on NATO and other Western security alliances to maintain stability and security in Europe and beyond. However, the BRICS countries are increasingly asserting their own interests and values in global security issues, such as the conflict in Syria, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. For example, Russia's intervention in Syria and China's increasing military presence in the South China Sea have challenged the EU's approach to these issues, highlighting the need for a more nuanced and multilateral approach to global security.

Nevertheless, BRICS has yet to be recognised as fundamentally different to other multilateral groupings and regional forums. Instead, the EU’s actions have arguably reduced the value of the multilateral landscape to an increasingly dense set of partially overlapping formal and informal networks covering an ever-widening scope of policy areas, areas not worthy of coordination or cooperation efforts that differ from those of bilateral relations. What this current landscape fails to capture is that BRICS significantly impacts the EU and its conventional view of multilateralism in several ways. Where the EU strategic partnerships approach chooses to value individual states exclusively and does not engage with BRICS as a multilateral whole, BRICS adopts an ever-expanding and inclusive approach to multilateralism through member state participation in BRICS Plus and the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).

While there have been some efforts to engage in cooperation and dialogue between the EU and BRICS, such as the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership and the EU-India Summit, neither bloc has developed a defined approach to interacting with one another. This may be reflective of the differences mentioned above as well as of the urgent nature of other priorities on the organisations’ agendas. But it warrants a moment of reflection as to why BRICS has not developed an ‘EU strategy’ or why the EU does not have a ‘BRICS policy’.

The lack of consistent and tangible success from the EU’s strategic partnership with BRICS, beyond bilateral relations, raises questions about the substance of the partnership. Freire (2017) describes the crux of this issue as a structural disjuncture in EU-BRICS relations whereby neither grouping has invested in developing a common agenda based on shared interests or put into practice a strategy of engagement that reaps tangible success outside bilateral relations.

EU-BRICS engagement

The differences between the two blocs represent a structural disjuncture on three levels that provide a foundation on which BRICS may be positioned as posing a fundamental challenge to the EU as a multilateral ‘hegemon’ per se. More specifically, this disjuncture is seen in BRICS representing a major shift in global economic power, asserting its own interests and values in global governance forums and pursuing its own trade and security policies. The latter two aspects are particularly notable as challenging the EU’s approach to these issues.

Firstly, BRICS represents a new wave of economic growth challenging the dominance of the EU and other developed economies. While the EU has struggled to achieve sustained economic growth in recent years, BRICS has grown rapidly, fuelled by its large populations, natural resources and growing middle classes. This growth has led to a shift in global economic power towards BRICS, with China now the world's largest economy and other BRICS countries poised to overtake some EU countries in terms of GDP.

Secondly, BRICS is challenging the EU's influence in global governance and institutions by countering unequal power relations with mutual respect and recognition. The EU has historically been a significant player in international organisations such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, using its economic and political power to shape global norms and standards. However, BRICS is increasingly asserting its own interests and values in these institutions, calling for greater representation of developing nations and reform of international governance structures to reflect the needs and voices of the BRICS nations.

This assertion is most evident in the establishment and continued functioning of the New Development Bank (NDB), which aims to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS countries and other emerging economies. For one, in 2018, the NDB approved a loan of USD 300 million to the Government of India to construct the Mumbai Metro Rail System. The project aimed to provide a safe, reliable and affordable mass transit system to the citizens of Mumbai. The project has successfully created local employment and boosted economic growth in the region. In setting up the NDB, BRICS has moved beyond reliance on Bretton Woods institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, for economic assistance and Western development models and established an alternative, inclusive and accessible route to development rooted in multilateralism. This step has allowed the bloc to embed inclusivity as a norm in South-South cooperation and even in post-colonial development. BRICS is, thereby, not only addressing country-specific developmental needs; it is also challenging the historically Western neoliberal international order.

Thirdly, BRICS is challenging the EU's international trade and investment approach. The EU has traditionally strongly advocated free trade and investment liberalisation, promoting its interests through bilateral and multilateral agreements. However, BRICS has increasingly pursued trade and investment policies, often prioritising domestic industries and strategic interests. This difference has led to tensions between the EU and BRICS, with the EU accusing China and other BRICS countries of unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft. With over 40% of the world's population and significant global GDP and trade, BRICS has evolved into a more consolidated and institutionalised actor, focusing on economic cooperation, strong global growth and financial regulation and reforming international financial institutions.

These aspects present a three-fold reality. Firstly, the EU has not developed a strategic approach towards BRICS despite its mild recognition of BRICS' influence in international relations. Secondly, bilateral strategic partnerships between the EU and individual BRICS member states have rarely gone beyond economic cooperation despite the significant potential to do otherwise. Finally, the absence of deeper EU-BRICS engagement may be a sign of hesitancy by the EU to engage in BRICS’ vision for a transformed international order and, in turn, a strategic shift by BRICS away from Western partnerships to focus on South-South cooperation.

This three-fold reality nuances two models of multilateralism at play alongside one another. As such, multilateralism does not simply exist within a certain set of conditions to be practised by an unchanging set of actors in a fixed context. Instead, as actors outside of the West have adopted multilateralism to pursue objectives suited to their levels of development and foreign policy interests, multilateralism has proven to be far more fluid and adaptive to actors’ needs and, by extension, to the changing international landscape. These two models do not even have to interact to thrive. This level of fluidity and adaptiveness makes multilateralism one of the most powerful tools states can employ to survive.

Russia-Ukraine: Matters Arising

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has undoubtedly shifted global power dynamics and country priorities, providing multilateralism with an entirely different backdrop in which to operate, adapt and serve purpose.

As Russia’s onslaught has persisted, Western nations have bolstered economic and military support for Ukraine, its neighbours and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members. Consequently, the rest of the world has been prompted to express their support for either ‘side’ of the conflict and its stance for or against the West’s response to Russia more strategically. However, Western nations, the majority of which are EU members such as Lithuania and Poland and supportive of Ukraine, have ramped up efforts to expand their network of allies and partners in a manner that, for nations not directly involved in the conflict, can only be described as polarising. This response has meant that the EU’s agenda for multilateral action has been defined by its willingness to support Ukraine’s effort against Russia, alongside existing domestic policy issues such as Brexit, leaving a sizeable gap in the region’s engagement with external actors – including BRICS members.

On the other hand, BRICS member states have exhibited a range of responses to the conflict, from condemnation of Russia to non-alignment – with no major sanctions, military assistance or aid commitments expressed by BRICS members. While these responses are underlined by historical and present-day economic and political relations with Russia, including its BRICS membership, they have not become a foundation for increased multilateral action between the EU and BRICS or other multilateral organisations.

In the last two years since the war started, BRICS’ relations with the EU have fallen to the wayside – from foreign policy engagement to bilateral relations between the EU and individual BRICS member states. However, this lack does not present a major departure from existing EU-BRICS relations, which have primarily been minimal due to several factors, most of which have to do with individual members’ interests and the priorities of each bloc. For one, the EU has had to contend with the consequences of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the election of former US President Donald Trump and the COVID-19 pandemic – all of which challenged the EU’s foreign and economic policies both internally as well as in established forums such as the UN and G7/20 formats. On the other hand, BRICS countries have prioritised building strategic partnerships, coordinating macroeconomic policy around trade and healthcare, establishing BRICSPlus cooperation on food security and climate change and bolstering funding by the New Development Bank toward infrastructure development. While some of these issue areas certainly overlap, they have not rendered active BRICS-EU cooperation on a formal basis.

While the focus of this paper is neither the EU nor its strategy, it is strongly recommended that the EU make a more sustained and visible effort at engaging and understanding BRICS and, by extension, newer and more diverse examples of multilateralism in practice. However, this recommendation may depart from the EU’s historical participation in and focus on formal multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, or issue-specific and ad hoc formats.

Plotting the future: BRICS Summit 2023

With the annual BRICS Summit underway, the summit agenda provides a significant platform on which present challenges and future opportunities for the bloc may be considered. This section will discuss both while building on the ongoing discussion of BRICS-EU relations.

A key agenda item for this year’s summit is the increasing interest shown by at least 12 countries to join BRICS, including Angola, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Argentina. The diversity of interested countries must be emphasised as demonstrating the widespread appeal BRICS has for developed and developing countries across continents. While formal accession criteria have not been set, current member states may consider the role the candidate countries play in their respective regions and whether they demonstrate BRICS values as well as their willingness to reflect the scale of cooperation and growth BRICS promotes in its policy framework and institutions. Additionally, BRICS could leverage the increasing interest in membership to cooperate with regional integration blocs and regional organisations in which BRICS countries are members, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, African Union, MERCOSUR, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). This step may also present an opportunity for cooperation between BRICS and the EU, given that the EU’s accession process under the Copenhagen Criteria is not only well established but considers several elements of candidate countries that are relevant for BRICS. These elements include an assessment of a candidate country’s domestic economy and its capacity to cope with competition and market forces. However, BRICS is unlikely to follow the EU in extensively assessing candidate countries’ democracies, rules of law, political institutions, and human rights regulations.

Perhaps the second most anticipated agenda item for the summit is potentially establishing a new reserve currency to serve member states’ economic interests better. The BRICS reserve currency is a proposed financial instrument that would be used as an alternative to the US Dollar and other major currencies. The idea was first floated in 2009 by the leaders of the BRICS members as a means of reducing their dependence on the US Dollar and promoting greater economic independence. According to the Deputy Directory of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Foreign Policy Planning Department, Pavel Knyazev, the proposal called for the creation of a currency reserve pool that would be used to stabilise the value of the currencies of the BRICS nations. The pool would be funded by each country contributing a portion of their foreign currency reserves and managed by a central bank in the BRICS region. The initial idea has consistently been met with mild scepticism, as there have been concerns about the feasibility of such a currency and its potential impact on global financial markets. However, the idea has gained momentum and been developed.

The BRICS nations have also promoted greater use of their currencies in international trade, with agreements signed to facilitate direct trade in local currencies between member countries. This use is seen as a critical step in reducing the dominance of the US Dollar in global trade and finance. While the BRICS reserve currency is still in the early stages of development, it has the potential to alter the global financial landscape significantly. Knyazev has noted that member states are “actively studying mechanisms” to exchange financial information to develop a reliable alternative for international payments. If successful, it could give member countries greater economic independence and reduce their vulnerability to external economic shocks. More so, it may challenge the influence and accessibility of the more established Euro. However, there are still significant challenges to be overcome, and it remains to be seen whether the currency will gain widespread acceptance and adoption.

Given its continued and “relatively successful” use of the Euro, the EU may take this opportunity to exchange lessons with BRICS. These lessons may include an understanding of the establishment of institutions such as the European Central Bank, the EU’s convergence criteria its member states have to meet before the Euro can be adopted and that ensure transparency and accountability in multilateral monetary and economic policies as well as crisis management mechanisms in managing currency stability and exchange rate policies.

Beyond the summit, the EU could more evidently leverage its status as the largest trading partner to BRICS as a foundation for deeper economic cooperation that could go beyond bilateral partnerships and well into the realm of multilateral trade, investment and market access. More than economic cooperation, the EU could establish multilateral pathways for information sharing and technological exchange. For one, the EU has several frameworks for cooperation with countries and regions that highlight the need for ongoing evaluation, adaptation and improvement. Examples include the Cotonou Agreement and Post-Cotonou Agreement, which provide a framework for cooperation between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Under those agreements, despite the infancy of the latter, the EU has arguably contributed to the maintenance of unequal power relations and one-side cooperation, resulting in unsustainable cycles of reliance on development aid to stimulate economic growth as well as insufficient involvement of civil society and local stakeholders from development initiatives, such as in projects under the Investment Facility for the Pacific and European Development Fund.

South Africa may staunchly pursue BRICS support and involvement in developing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) for this summit. South African Foreign Minister Naledi Pandor has said that there are “immense opportunities for BRICS to participate” in the AfCFTA, specifically by supporting the goals of the AfCFTA including diversification of exports, increased productive capacity, entrepreneurial opportunities, technology transfer, employment opportunities, broadening economic inclusion and acceleration of growth. Just recently, UN Secretary-General Antonia Guterres stressed that realising the AfCFTA calls for actions across several critical areas of investment, adding that “we need a fundamental reform of the global financial system so that Africa is represented at the highest level” – a clear reminder of BRICS’ aims. Notably, the EU’s contribution of political, financial and technical support to the development of the AfCFTA is a rare example of EU-BRICS cooperation and of a more established multilateral body aiding the development of a newer multilateral objective. This example can only be seen as positive for both BRICS and the EU in achieving their respective policy goals and as an opportunity to witness the coexistence of ‘old’ and ‘new’ multilateralism.

This opportunity may even translate into cooperation between BRICS and the EU on the just transition. BRICS and the EU could cooperate on several fronts related to, for example, South Africa’s ongoing energy crisis, the implication of the Russia-Ukraine war on Europe’s energy supply and the climate change's global impact. The first cooperation may be sharing best practices and aiding in technical assistance and capacity building, given that the EU has made significant advancements in renewable energy policies and practices. At the same time, many BRICS members are still heavily reliant on fossil fuels and lack the infrastructure for a transition to cleaner energy sources. Moreover, creating opportunities for regular policy dialogues and cooperative frameworks to facilitate the exchange of ideas, experiences, data and skills needed to advance a just transition would go far in deepening cooperation between the EU and BRICS beyond economic or political engagement.

Aaliyah Vayez

Aaliyah Vayez is a South African-born international relations specialist consulting in global regulatory and government affairs in London. Vayez earned a Masters in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences as a Commonwealth Scholar, prior to which she completed a Bachelor of Social Science and Honours in International Relations, both cum laude, at the University of Cape Town. Her professional background includes political and security risk consulting and research into natural resource governance and democracy. She has represented South Africa in fields of diplomacy and development at both national and international levels and maintained a record of published written pieces on topics including (but not limited to) South African foreign policy, BRICS diplomacy and development and Russia’s presence in Africa. Her ongoing research interests include post-Brexit UK relations with South Africa, regionalism in Africa and BRICS.