Zambia’s Aug 13, 2026 election sees President Hakainde Hichilema face 13 rivals amid expanded 226-seat parliament with reserved seats. Key questions: contenders, system integrity, and final outcome.
Zambia is scheduled to hold general elections on 13 August 2026. The ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) leader, Hakainde Hichilema, is seeking re-election on a platform of economic revival, improved service provision, and the mass employment of youth in the civil service and military branches. He faces 13 other contenders. The election itself is a continuity of Zambia’s relatively outstanding history of conducting fairly credible democratic elections.
Compared with its more troubled neighbours, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe, Zambia stands out as a beacon of democracy and peace in the sub-region. It has been peaceful since independence in 1964 and has had three peaceful changes of power through the ballot (1991, 2011, and 2021). Similarly, the country smoothly navigated the deaths of two incumbent presidents, in 2008 and 2014. The country also boasts relatively credible public institutions, an active (but increasingly underfunded) civil society, and a critical and fairly engaged citizenry.
This, however, should not paint a perfect picture of the country, as it has often swung between extremes of authoritarianism and liberal democracy without settling into either. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, in 2020, considered Zambia one of the world's top ten fastest-autocratizing countries. However, following the 2021 election and peaceful transfer of power, the country was celebrated as an example of democratic rebound. This vacillation demonstrates that the country’s democracy is not cast in stone, but is both vulnerable and resilient.
The 2026 general election comes in the wake of a major constitutional change in 2025. On 18 December 2025, President Hichilema signed into law the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2025. The amendment makes three major changes to the constitution: first, introducing 40 parliamentary seats allocated on a proportional representation basis (20 for women, 15 for youth, and 5 for persons with disabilities); second, increasing the number of constituency-based parliamentary seats from 156 to 226; and third, abolishing the requirement to cancel the election and nomination of candidates when a candidate resigns, withdraws, or is disqualified by court. The most significant change is the increase in the number of parliamentary constituencies. When the proposal to increase the number of constituencies was announced, it was initially strongly opposed by civil society and the opposition, who feared that it would lead to gerrymandering. However, following a delimitation exercise and the announcement of seats that appeared to be evenly distributed across the country, criticism has largely dissipated. These changes to the constitution necessitated consequential amendments to other electoral laws and implementation frameworks. These were only enacted in May 2026, close to the elections, disrupting some of the logistical and preparatory work the Electoral Commission had already undertaken. Whether the Commission has adequately aligned itself with the changes can only be fully assessed after the election.
Several institutions play a major role in the electoral process, but the dominant ones are the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), which has the constitutional mandate to conduct elections; the Zambia Police, which is mandated to provide security; and the judiciary, which has the duty to resolve electoral disputes. Although the executive governmental branch has a dominant role in appointing personnel to these three entities, they still enjoy some residual autonomy and discretion in managing their responsibilities.
Surveys also suggest that citizens still have some faith in these institutions. The Afrobarometer Round 10 survey showed that 37.7 percent of respondents trusted the ECZ “a lot”, 20.0 percent “somewhat”, 20.3 percent “just a bit”, and 14.7 percent “not at all.” The judiciary scored comparable results, with 39.8 percent having “a lot” of confidence, 22.2 percent “somewhat”, 20.5 percent “a little”, and only 13.2 percent with no confidence at all. Of the three, the police registered the lowest level of confidence, with 32.3 percent having “a lot” of confidence, 24.9 percent “somewhat”, 20.1 percent “a little”, and 20.9 percent without any confidence at all. The Zambia Election Research Network (ZERN) survey also suggests that citizens are confident of a peaceful and credible 2026 election. It showed that 51 percent of respondents were confident that the 2026 election would be free and fair, and 70 percent did not fear for their safety.
Zambian voters have experience changing governments at least three times. As a result, they have strong faith in the power of the vote and believe they have the power to remove or retain a government. Voters, therefore, actively engage with the democratic process. They are reasonably well-informed and have clear views of the country’s political institutions, the challenges it faces, and what they want for its future.
In terms of voting preferences, three factors inform Zambian voting decisions. The first is service delivery: Zambians are more interested in service delivery as an outcome than policy debates about how to achieve it, which leads political parties to campaign around “development” with little policy content. The second, as expert Erin Hern has argued, is that people use their past experiences with service delivery both to evaluate the incumbent’s performance and to determine whether there is any value in political participation. The third is that voters balance their experiences with service delivery against considerations of ethno-regional identity to determine which party is most likely to benefit their community. Given this context, citizens often raise issues of service delivery, the cost of living, and the ethnic distribution of public goods in political debates.
Following the dissolution of Parliament in May 2026, 14 presidential candidates were validly nominated to run in the election. The incumbent, President Hichilema, is seeking re-election and stands on a platform of economic recovery, service provision, and fiscal discipline, having steered the country from negative economic growth to restructuring its public debt. The party’s manifesto highlights the following key achievements over the last five years: a free primary and secondary education policy that has enabled more than 2.5 million learners to access education; the elimination of political violence in public spaces; the restructuring of the country’s international debt; a significant increase in the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) from about K1.6 million to K40 million, which has enabled locally driven development projects; the employment of many youth in the civil service, primarily in the health, education, agriculture, and security sectors; the reduction of inflation to single digits; and the restoration of the country’s international credibility. If elected, Hichilema promises to, among other things, create two million jobs; increase student enrolment in trade schools to provide youth with skills; double the size of the economy; expand manufacturing and electricity generation; and increase copper production to three million metric tonnes.
Although the opposition is fragmented and largely ill-organised to threaten the ruling party, the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity (NRPUP), led by Brian Mundubile, appears to have gained momentum since the commencement of the campaign period in May 2026. The NRPUP’s manifesto laments the decline in democracy, the high cost of living, food insecurity, and youth unemployment. It promises to deliver tangible economic benefits to the people. More specifically, it promises to change how the government works, replace empty promises with disciplined delivery of services, restore dignity and compassion to the presidency, and put an end to executive overreach by returning power to its rightful owners: the people of Zambia.
Considering the fragmentation of the opposition, it is widely expected that the president will retain his position. An opinion poll by the Zambia Election Research Network (ZERN) and the University of Cape Town’s Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (IDCPPA), published in March 2026, indicates that 55 percent of respondents would vote for the president, 32 percent were undecided, and only 13 percent would vote for an opposition candidate. It also appears that the ruling party might dominate the legislature, as the opposition failed to feature candidates in many constituencies. Out of 226 available constituency seats, parties featured candidates as follows:
| Name of Party | Number of Parliamentary Candidates out of 2026 Seats |
| UPND | 226 |
| NRPUP | 155 |
| CF | 80 |
| SP | 73 |
| RP | 37 |
| ZMP | 18 |
| LM | 09 |
| Other parties | Less than 9 |
| Independent candidates | 382 |
Source: Electoral Commission of Zambia
This projection suggests that the opposition’s failure to find candidates in almost one-third of the seats will give the ruling party an uncontested advantage in those constituencies, with the only major competition coming from independent candidates. Already, at the close of nominations in May 2026, an unprecedented 15 ruling party parliamentary candidates were unopposed. Given this picture, it is not a question of whether the ruling party will win but what it will do once returned to power with a strong majority in the legislature. Considering the ease with which it amended the constitution in 2025, there is growing concern that giving the ruling party overwhelming control of Parliament may tempt it to enact illiberal laws and amend the constitution further to consolidate power.
Dr. O’Brien Kaaba teaches law at the University of Zambia and is a senior research fellow at the Southern African Institute for Policy and Research (SAIPAR), where he heads the Political and Social Change Department. He has published extensively on elections, democracy, and good governance.
