Summary

Introduction

Dependent on China for significant portions of its supply of critical raw materials (CRMs),¹ the European Union (EU) has spent nearly two years working to free its supply chains from Chinese influence. The EU views Beijing's dominance over these supply chains as a threat to its economy, industries, and security.

To achieve its goals, the EU has initiated several political, legislative, and economic measures, either independently – such as the EU Critical Raw Materials Act² (CRMA) and the Global Gateway Initiative (GGI)³ – or in collaboration with like-minded partners, including the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP).⁴

In the CRMA, the EU's overarching strategic policy document on critical minerals, the EU has set targets regarding its level of external dependence and the timeline for achieving these goals.⁵ In its Critical Minerals Action Plan of 2020, the EU Commission recommended that the EU identify projects and engage in strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa to diversify its supply.

While bilateral partnerships have formed the cornerstone of EU efforts to date, they take place within a global supply chain landscape that is deeply shaped by China’s dominance in mineral processing and Africa’s growing strategic importance as a supplier. As such, efforts to reduce dependency or enhance supply security inevitably unfold within a web of interdependencies and competing interests.

Against this backdrop, this paper explores the necessity of and opportunities for trilateral cooperation by examining the dynamics and interactions among the three regions – the EU, China, and Africa – within global critical mineral supply chains, it considers how their interests intersect, how they currently interact both globally and within Africa, and what scope exists for more cooperative approaches.

Ultimately, the paper proposes a scenario for trilateral cooperation and discusses how it can be implemented to address the interests of all stakeholders.

The initial plan for this paper included interviews with EU private sector representatives and African stakeholders to gather insights and enhance its analysis. However, efforts to engage with EU representatives were unsuccessful, resulting in a reliance on publicly available information to infer their positions on some of the discussed issues.

Insights from African stakeholders – including mining executives and political figures in the DRC, Zambia, civil societies and mining experts in Guinea and Zambia, and international African civil servants in African regional organizations – were gathered through interviews conducted under Chatham House rules, between June, July 2024 as part of another research and from October 2024 to late December 2024.

Trilateral Cooperation in Context

Interactions and agreements between the entities analyzed for this paper have been ramping up in recent years. This is particularly true for relations between African states and the EU. Under the GGI – which primarily aims to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and allocates half of the EU’s €300 billion investment budget – several memoranda of understanding (MoUs) were signed between the EU and African countries. This includes agreements with Namibia, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Rwanda, signed between 2022 and 2024.

These MoUs build on existing collaborations between the EU and various African countries regarding CRMs. For instance, South Africa, Guinea, and the DRC supply 41% of the EU's manganese, 63% of its aluminum, and 35% of its tantalum.⁶

For the EU, these MoUs are framed within a context of geopolitical rivalry with China. However, for African countries involved, the primary focus remains on economic and industrial development, with the mid- to long-term goals of establishing local value chains for CRMs and thereby enhancing their position within global value chains.

If implemented as intended, these agreements could facilitate cooperation and engagements that would enable the EU to secure its CRM supply while addressing the demand for improved participation in CRM value chains from host countries.

Therefore, it is essential to resist the temptation to interpret the signing of these MoUs by African nations as an inclination towards confrontational geopolitics. Such an assumption would be both erroneous and misleading.

In what seems to be a new cold war between Western nations and China, African leaders have repeatedly affirmed their intention not to take sides. For a country like the DRC, its engagements with the EU reflect a desire to diversify its mining portfolio by inviting new stakeholders and leveraging EU interests in cobalt to advance its local value chain for cobalt and electric vehicle (EV) batteries. This diversification should not be interpreted as a move to distance itself from China⁷ – which remains a key player in the country’s critical mining sector.

An example of this non-exclusive approach to engagement and diversification is the CEO of the Congolese public company responsible for artisanal cobalt, Entreprise Générale du Cobalt. At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2024, he presented two pilot cobalt projects to Chinese investors for which he has already signed an agreement with Cobalt for Development (C4D)⁸, an initiative funded by Volkswagen, BMW, and Samsung and run by the German Development Agency (GIZ). He is also negotiating with the EU and USAID⁹for financial support for feasibility studies.

A recent report¹⁰ by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) on perceptions of China and the EU’s engagement in Africa’s green transition confirmed that the EU’s involvement is partly driven by a desire for diversification that does not come at the expense of relations with China. EU officials have recognized the importance of toning down the narrative of “confronting China” to prioritize the EU’s offering to African countries.

The above-mentioned report also highlights interest in EU-China-Africa cooperation in CRM supply chains. Stakeholders interviewed for the report struggled to articulate a position that aligns with the EU's geopolitical goals while addressing concerns about China's mining practices in Africa. They also faced challenges balancing these considerations with the host countries’ demands for local value chain development, particularly given the difficulties within their mining industries. While they see potential benefits for all parties involved, they also acknowledge the complexity of the current landscape that hinder cooperation.

Moreover, beyond these considerations, cooperation in CRM supply chains – particularly when governments take the lead in organizing such efforts – is further complicated by the fragmented nature of these chains, the diversity of actors involved, economic and governance asymmetries among participating countries, the varying capacities of these actors to intervene in supply chains, their existing relationships within them, and the presence or absence of coherent national agendas regarding critical raw materials.

Given the fragmentation of supply chains, a diverse array of stakeholders is involved at different stages. Despite the growing trend toward vertical integration – where midstream and downstream players, such as manufacturers of electric vehicle batteries, partner with mining companies – the chain remains highly fragmented.

The multitude of non-state and semi-state actors, comprising both private and public companies, underscores the significant challenges that governments in both the EU and partner countries face in implementing their competitive or collaborative policies.

For instance, the EU has struggled to compel private companies to reduce their engagements with Chinese firms within their supply chains.

Last year, we witnessed conflicting views between EU policymakers and the private sector regarding the decoupling from China and measures against Chinese EVs in Europe.

In 2024, German automakers and Spanish authorities expressed concern about and opposition to the tariff barriers imposed by Brussels on Chinese EVs. They feared such measures could spark a trade war, prompting China to retaliate and potentially harming European car manufacturers, as China constitutes a significant portion of their global market.

The disconnect between European decision-makers and the private sector raises questions about the credibility of the EU’s offer, particularly when it emphasizes a desire to compete with China through the GGI in the Global South, especially in Africa, where China’s influence is prominent.

This disconnect is also cited by European officials as a reason for toning down the “countering China” aspect of the GGI initiative, as noted in the ECDPM report.

Despite these challenges, a dialogue on potential cooperation between the EU, China, and Africa appears necessary. This is due to China's deep integration into global supply chains, its substantial presence in several African countries that produce CRMs, the EU's reliance on China for these materials, and the EU's increasing strategic focus on Africa.

EU-China: The Case for Cooperation

At the outset, it is important to remember that cooperation is the norm in the global supply chains of CRMs, whether or not we are discussing trilateral cooperation. These chains are sustained by thousands of commercial partnerships and agreements across continents, involving private, state, and semi-state companies. From mines to intermediaries to finished products, CRMs are moved by a series of multinational entities.

For emphasis, it is essential to note that China’s dominance in the value chains of most CRMs is predominantly concentrated in the midstream and downstream segments,¹¹ which include processing, refinement, and the production of intermediate and finished goods.

In global EV battery supply chains, China does not dominate the upstream sector, except for graphite.¹² This indicates that non-Chinese upstream mining companies maintain active relationships with Chinese mid- and downstream firms, which in turn supply businesses across the global market.

An analysis of EU-China interactions in CRMs reveals a similar dynamic. Among the fifty-one CRMs identified in the European Commission’s Study on the Critical Raw Materials 2023, China dominates extraction for only five minerals, accounting for over 50% of global production. However, in processing, China's dominance extends to twenty-four minerals, particularly in rare earth elements, where its global share exceeds 50%, reaching 85% for light rare earth elements and 100% for heavy rare earth elements.

Regarding EU sourcing, China is the primary supplier for twenty-three of the EU’s CRMs, with a reliance of over 50% for eighteen of those where China dominates refining.

The study also highlights the EU's heavy dependence on imports of processed minerals. A similar conclusion can be drawn from a close examination of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) data on critical minerals trade, which reveals that a substantial portion of interactions between the EU and China occurs in the midstream and downstream segments of the supply chain, where the EU imports more processed materials, refining, intermediate manufacturing, and final goods.

This same dynamic is evident in Chinese investment in Europe's CRM-related sectors.

While there have been some upstream cooperation ventures, such as between France's nickel miner ERAMET and China's TSINGSHAN in lithium in Argentina,¹³ or failed attempts involving ERAMET, TSINGSHAN and Germany's BASF in nickel in Indonesia, there are far more activities in the advanced segments of the chain than upstream.

Notably, China’s EV battery maker CATL is currently building a $7.3 billion EV battery plant in Hungary, set to become Europe’s largest EV battery facility, along with another $4.1 billion lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP) EV battery plant in Spain, in joint venture with Spain’s STELLANTIS.

In mid-December 2024, the Slovak battery maker INOBAT partnered with China’s Gotion Hitech to construct a gigafactory in Slovakia, and French nuclear company ORANO announced the establishment of two joint ventures with China’s XTC New Energy to build EV battery component plants in France.

These investments reflect China’s interest in the EU and the nature of China-EU interactions in global supply chains. They also demonstrate Chinese adaptation mechanisms in response to the EU's restrictive measures and policies regarding the Chinese EV industry.

The entrenchment and dependency of the EU CRM supply chain on China have led some European companies to caution against restrictive measures that could trigger a trade war with China, potentially harming European industries. These warnings from the private sector arise as EU initiatives to develop a supply chain free from China are lagging.

In its assessment of the EU’s CRMA implementation, the London-based market intelligence agency Benchmark Minerals has noted that the EU is unlikely to meet its CRM goals by 2030. Processing and recycling efforts are far behind the targets of 40% and 25%, respectively.

These warnings are also grounded in the realities of technological progress and the economic viability of CRM supply chains.

In November 2024, Eramet highlighted that profitable nickel mining would only be feasible and profitable with China, which possesses the expertise and technology to produce it at a lower cost. A few weeks earlier, Albermarle, the United States (US) lithium giant and the world's largest producer, stated that in the current market situation, it was impossible to end dependence on China, as producing lithium and other critical metals profitably in Europe and North America was unfeasible.

The recent downfall of the Swedish battery maker Northvolt served as a reminder of this reality and sent shockwaves through Europe.

According to executives and experts interviewed by Reuters, the future of Europe’s EV battery supply chain will depend on joint ventures with Chinese companies, hence the aforementioned investments.

The situation – characterized by the EU’s reliance on China’s supply and the time required for the EU initiatives to yield results – raises the question of whether an immediate confrontation with China is the right approach. A confrontational stance could seriously compromise European supplies in the short and medium term, putting European industries in jeopardy.

Considering the EU's immediate and forecasted demands for CRMs, a cooperative approach with China and its companies could be explored. This strategy would enable the EU to methodically develop its supply chain without creating potentially damaging chaos. Such cooperation is not antithetical to the goals of establishing an independent supply chain.¹⁴

The geopolitical narrative has framed the issues as a zero-sum game, pitting the concept of an independent supply chain against the possibility of cooperation. In absolute terms, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive. Moreover, some argue that complete decoupling from China is simply not feasible.¹⁵

Given the recognized importance of cooperation within supply chains and the ambitions of the EU, the key question regarding EU-China collaboration is how it can strategically benefit the EU. Effective cooperation should focus on addressing existing gaps and enhancing the resilience of the EU's supply chain for the future.

This brief does not seek to answer this question. However, a potential solution may lie in the proposed EU bill aimed at compelling Chinese companies to transfer technology¹⁶ to EU companies to qualify for EU subsidies.

Where Does Africa Stand?

Having established the case for EU-China cooperation, the next question to address is where Africa fits into this discussion and in which segment of the supply chain trilateral cooperation can occur.

A. Africa’s CRM Mining Landscape

Examining Africa’s endowment of CRMs, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Mining Development Center (AMDC) report that Africa holds nearly 30% of the CRMs necessary for clean energy and energy transition. The continent boasts significant reserves of cobalt (in the DRC), bauxite (in Guinea), manganese (in South-Africa and Gabon), Platinum-group metal (PGMs) (in South-Africa), graphite (in Mozambique) and nickel (in Madagascar).

However, it is important to note that Africa’s share of global reserves for several of these CRMs is relatively modest. According to the AMDC’s African Green Minerals Observatory, Africa's lithium reserves account for only 6% of global reserves, while it holds 2% of rare earth elements. The DRC¹⁷ and Zambia have 6% and 4.2% of global copper and nickel production, respectively. On a larger scale, Bauxite, cobalt, graphite, and manganese represent 24%, 48%, 21%, and 43% of world reserves, respectively.

Regarding its characteristics, Africa's mining sector is primarily extractive, with limited capabilities for advanced processing of CRMs. South Africa stands out as an exception, responsible for approximately 75% of global PGMs refining.¹⁸ It has also established a battery-grade nickel sulfate plant. Similarly, the DRC and Zambia are involved in copper refining, with the DRC holding a 6.5% share of global copper refining, trailing behind China and Chile.¹⁹

Despite producing an average of 70% of the world’s cobalt annually, the DRC lacks advanced processing capabilities for this mineral. Cobalt is processed into cobalt hydroxide locally before being shipped to China for further refining into cobalt sulfate, a key component used in EV batteries.

This trend is consistent across other minerals on the continent.

The extractive sector is largely dominated by foreign-owned companies, which exert more control over production than the governments and entities of host countries. Chinese companies are particularly prominent in the DRC with copper and cobalt, in Guinea with bauxite, and in Zimbabwe and Mali with lithium. In South Africa, the main stakeholders in PGMs are South African and US firms. Thus, aside from the DRC, Zimbabwe, Guinea, and Mali, China’s presence in Africa’s CRMs has historically been relatively limited.

The EU’s presence is also minimal, with Eramet involved in manganese production in Gabon. The Swiss company Glencore, although not part of the EU, represents one of the most significant European presences in CRM production, operating two copper-cobalt mining operations in the DRC. There are instances of cooperation between Chinese and Western firms, such as the Canadian Ivanhoe and Chinese Zijin mining joint venture in the DRC, or the Chinese Huayou’s partnership with the Australian company Askari in Namibia.

National stakeholders primarily consist of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which possess several mining permits and often act as minority partners in joint ventures with foreign firms. In recent years, Zambia, the DRC, and Guinea have taken steps to secure larger shares for their SOEs in these partnerships. This approach aims to enhance government control and oversight over a vital industry and ensure that the government has a voice in a sector that can significantly impact the national economy.

Partnering with these SOEs can help foreign companies mitigate risks by providing access to dormant projects or those with solid data, reserves, and historical production already established. This reduces the costs and risks associated with greenfield projects that start from exploration. This strategy has enabled Chinese companies, which did not invest in exploration or discovering new deposits, to enter and dominate the cobalt industry in the DRC and the lithium sector in Zimbabwe.

The Belgian materials technology company UMICORE recently employed this strategy to produce germanium concentrates from the DRC, benefitting from China’s export ban on germanium to become a producer. The company entered a technical partnership with the DRC’s SOE GECAMINES’s subsidiary Société pour le Traitement du terril de Lubumbashi (STL) after China imposed restrictions on germanium exports.

The Umicore-Stl agreement exemplifies the type of bilateral cooperation that can occur between the EU and Africa.

In terms of CRM regulations and policies, the abundance of initiatives at the continental level – such as the AMDC’s African Green Mineral Strategy and the Africa Union Commodity Strategy – stands in stark contrast to the scarcity of strategic policies at the national level, where the focus tends to be on export bans for raw CRMs.

One notable exception is Zambia, which launched the Zambia National Critical Mineral Strategy 2024-2028 in August 2024, outlining the country’s strategic vision and objectives for critical minerals. This policy provides a framework for both Zambia and external partners to engage in critical minerals within the country (see Box 1).

B. China in African CRM value chains

In the broader discussion on CRM supply chains, local value addition is a central theme. Producing countries in Africa have been striving to enhance their position in the global supply chain by advocating for local value chains.

Measures have been taken to ban the export of raw CRMs, aiming to compel mining companies to establish advanced refining and processing capabilities locally. Zimbabwe imposed a ban on raw lithium in December 2022, requiring mining companies, predominantly Chinese, to construct processing plants to produce battery-grade lithium for use in EV batteries.

Similar initiatives have been announced in the DRC, where the government is also working on developing a local EV battery value chain. Governmental bodies such as the Conseil Congolais de la Batterie (Congolese Battery Council) and regional and international MoUs have been pursued, though they have not yet yielded results, with Zambia first in 2022 and the U.S. in 2023.

In response to these demands, mining companies, all of which are Chinese, have cited structural challenges – such as the industrial landscape, insufficient electricity and chemical inputs, and a lack of local expertise – as primary obstacles.

However, as a first step towards meeting government demands, they have built spodumene lithium concentrators in Zimbabwe, four of which were inaugurated in 2024, as well as in Nigeria and Namibia. Similar facilities have also been announced in Mali.

The vast majority of these lithium projects in Africa are Chinese, reflecting the increase in Chinese investments in CRM mining projects worldwide.²⁰

According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024, half of the lithium projects set to launch in Africa by 2027 will be Chinese. In 2023, Benchmark Minerals predicted that China would dominate Africa's lithium production over the next decade. In addition to lithium, Chinese companies have been increasing cobalt production in the DRC. CMOC, the world’s largest cobalt producer, announced in an interview in mid-December to the China Global South Project its intention to expand its Tenke and Kisanfu cobalt mines in the DRC despite the price slump.

In early 2024, China MMG acquired the Khoemacau copper mine in Botswana for $1.9 billion after acquiring Canada-based Cuprous Capital. JCHX Mining, a Chinese company based in Hong Kong, made a similar move by acquiring the copper Lubambe mine in Zambia. In July 2024, the company announced it would invest $300 million in the project.

The increase in Chinese mining projects in Africa reflects, to some extent, the vulnerabilities in China’s dominant position within CRM supply chains. While China maintains dominance in the mid- and downstream segments of these chains, it faces a significant reliance on imports of raw minerals. Therefore, like the EU, amid geopolitical tensions surrounding CRMs, securing access to CRM mining projects is strategically important to China.

However, given the persistent demand from African countries for local processing, China's commitment to CRMs in Africa cannot be limited to an extractive approach upstream in Africa. Its presence in Africa must also address the needs of African countries. Aware of this pressure, and beyond the individual initiatives taken by a few companies in Zimbabwe and elsewhere, Beijing pledged at the last FOCAC²¹ in Beijing to support African countries in realizing their ambitions. This commitment, if fulfilled, could significantly alter the dynamics of China's CRM presence in Africa and create a new context likely to influence how new players, such as those from the EU, engage in CRM activities on the continent and interact with one another. This is where Africa becomes an intersection between the EU and China’s interests in securing access to raw minerals.

China-Africa-EU Trilateral Cooperation: Where?

An analysis of the dynamics between the EU and China, their respective ambitions in Africa and on the global stage, and the aspirations of African-producing countries reveals a landscape with potential for both trilateral cooperation and risks of confrontation. However, contrary to prevailing perceptions of China’s role in Africa’s mining sector, the risk of confrontation is significantly lower –nearly negligible.

A detailed comparison of the EU’s CRMs, including those from its global and African suppliers, with China's footprint in Africa’s CRM sector shows minimal overlap in their strategic interests. This lack of intersection substantially reduces the risk of confrontation, making cooperation a more viable solution for all parties involved.

One notable exception is Guinean bauxite, which accounts for 63%²² of the EU's consumption and where China is present through Société Minière de Boké. Beyond this, China is almost nonexistent in the production of other CRMs supplied by Africa to the EU, such as coltan in the DRC, manganese in South Africa, and phosphate rock in Morocco.

In fact, Africa is not the EU’s main supplier of CRMs. Even for minerals such as lithium and copper, where China is present in Africa, the EU sources these materials predominantly from Chile (79%)²³ and Poland (19%),²⁴ respectively. As for cobalt, the EU Commission's report indicates that data are not reliable enough to determine the exact origin of the cobalt consumed by the EU and the share it accounts for.

Given the current landscape, there is very limited space that may necessitate cooperation. However, the need and incentives for trilateral cooperation are likely to emerge from the EU’s active future engagements with Africa.

A. Unlikely cooperation in extraction

A renewed or expanded effort by the EU to engage in CRM extraction in Africa may foster greater interaction. However, focusing solely on extraction – without investing in processing – would likely benefit China more than the EU or Africa. China already dominates the more advanced segments of the supply chain, while both the EU and African nations aim not only to secure raw materials but also to refine and process them locally, thereby fostering stronger value chains.

Additionally, Africa’s demand for local processing makes it virtually impossible for any form of engagement or cooperation – whether bilateral or trilateral – not to include midstream and downstream activities.

Moreover, the aforementioned cooperation at the extractive level provides little incentive for African countries, which are also seeking to diversify their partnerships, to advocate for it. The arrival of European companies is highly sought after by many in Africa,²⁵ particularly to help raise local industry standards and offer bargaining leverage against Chinese companies, making it unlikely that governments will miss this opportunity to promote trilateral cooperation with China.

Furthermore, the EU may find it difficult to persuade private European companies to invest in new projects in Africa. From exploration to production, launching a full mining operation takes an average of ten to fifteen years. Considering the real or perceived risks associated with Africa, there will be very little economic incentive for European companies to risk launching new projects there, especially as they have no objection to working with Chinese companies on more advanced segments of the chain, where financial incentives are higher.

Midstream and downstream segments yield significantly higher benefits than upstream activities. For instance, mining and essential refining contribute a combined market value of $55 billion in the lithium-ion battery chain. In contrast, the midstream and downstream segments – comprising component production, cell production, assembly, and end users – are worth approximately $9 trillion.²⁶

Finally, the EU's relatively low processing capacity for critical minerals compared to China presents a further obstacle. Direct access to raw ores would only align with the EU’s objectives of establishing a China-free supply chain to the extent that ores mined in Africa can be directly refined and processed in Europe or in friendly countries.

B. Convergence in Midstream and Downstream Segments

Midstream and downstream segments are the areas where interests converge, albeit for different reasons. The EU and Africa look forward to building and strengthening their presence in these segments. At first glance, China, which dominates these areas, might seem uninterested in cooperating. However, several factors may nudge it toward a different approach.

First, considering its current position in the DRC’s cobalt and copper market, as well as Zimbabwe’s lithium and the demands for advanced processing in these countries, China must find satisfactory responses to these demands. Despite Zimbabwe’s recent easing of its ban on raw lithium export, the country is unlikely to abandon its ambitions.

Zimbabwe’s president, Emerson Mnangagwa, inaugurated the fourth lithium concentrator for spodumene in November 2023 and reminded Chinese companies that the goal remains battery-grade lithium processing. They had, until March 2024, to develop a plan to meet these demands. This pressure prompted Sinomine to announce plans to build a battery-grade lithium plant in Zimbabwe within the next three to five years, while Zhejiang Huayou is working on the project's feasibility.

The recent signing of the roadmap for implementing the MoU between the DRC and the EU, as part of the GGI, signals the country's determination to advance with its ambitions to develop a local value chain for CRMs.

The second factor involves the EU’s restrictions on Chinese CRM-related products. In the face of these measures, China has shown a willingness to delocalize certain activities in these segments to Europe or third countries, such as Morocco, to maintain access to the European market.

Thus, from a Chinese perspective, relocation appears feasible as long as it aligns with China's economic and commercial interests.

Cooperation Scenario

Considering the diverse value chains for various applications of end products derived from critical raw materials, focusing on the lithium-ion battery value chain²⁷ provides an effective way to explore these opportunities. Moreover, several producer countries have concentrated their demand for value addition on the EV battery value chain. For this scenario, we will utilize the lithium-ion value chain developed by Karkare and Medillina.²⁹

The mid- and downstream segments – precursor production, cell production, assembly and end-users EVs – of the battery value chain are complex, requiring a specific economic, industrial, and technological context to ensure financial viability.

Activities in these segments necessitate large, complete ecosystems – economies of scale – for success.²⁹ However, Africa's economic and industrial circumstances make it impossible for any single country to fulfill all these requirements. In fact, Chinese companies operating in Africa have raised this concern, which industry stakeholders in Africa have acknowledged during interviews conducted for this research. This is why a regional approach has already been suggested as a solution.

Considering the economic and industrial disparities among producing countries in Africa, the opportunities they provide, and the risks they present to stakeholders, cooperation will vary from one nation to another. This indicates that different types of cooperation will exist at various levels across segments and within different countries or regions, with some nations benefiting more than others.

Scenario: Cooperation in major CRM producing countries: DRC

In discussing the prerequisites for advanced local cobalt processing in the DRC, CMOC³⁰ highlighted deficits in energy, logistics and expertise. The Congolese mining sector faces an estimated electricity deficit of between 800 and 1000 MW.

The DRC was chosen for this scenario for several reasons: its status as the world's largest cobalt producer (accounting for 70% of global production), the significant presence of China in the cobalt sector as both a miner and refiner, the DRC’s ambitions for developing a local value chain, its MoU with the EU, and the forecast demand for cobalt in the EU.³¹

These factors create the conditions for a strong intersection of Chinese, European, and Congolese interests, which can foster both confrontation and cooperation.

The implementation would involve identifying solutions to the challenges hindering the development of an advanced cobalt refining and processing industry in the DRC.

Given the complexity and multifaceted nature of these challenges, we will focus on the prerequisites identified by China's CMOC:³³ enhancing infrastructure for reliable power, water, and transport; expanding skilled technical personnel through training and capacity-building; and improving logistics for efficient material and product movement.

By leveraging their strengths and addressing their weaknesses within the CRM supply chain, trilateral cooperation could involve each party addressing one or more prerequisites for local processing in the DRC, as well as providing technological solutions and support in legal, business and administrative areas to develop mid and downstream segments.

So, the implementation would go as follows:

Referring to the roadmap signed last December, technical training would be provided to the Congolese labor force to address this shortfall.

In this joint venture, Gécamines would hold a 50% stake to ensure Congolese ownership and mitigate sanctions that may be imposed on China-labeled CRM.

Using the cobalt collected as compensation in its other joint ventures, Gécamines can claim control of the cobalt to be refined.

In this scenario, the EU would secure a supply of refined cobalt, the DRC would develop an advanced, or a semi-advanced at least, cobalt refining industry, and China would gain access to the EU market.

Regarding logistics, the Lobito Corridor could effectively address the logistical challenges by connecting the mining province of Lualaba, where the processing unit will be built, to the port of Lobito in Angola.

Congolese stakeholders proposed this approach during interviews conducted for this research, emphasizing that whoever controls the power supply in the DRC will also control mining processing.

With China's loans for major infrastructure projects in Africa declining, the EU can enhance its role in the energy sector by leveraging its continental financial institutions and development banks.

The roadmap signed with the DRC indicates that EU intervention could focus on scientific cooperation, knowledge transfer, and financial support.

Beijing's ability to influence its companies will be instrumental in selecting which firms can participate in the joint ventures and ensuring the involvement of Chinese companies. EU decision-makers will not need to persuade European private companies to engage in this endeavor.

In terms of benefits for the DRC, this scenario will facilitate the development of its local processing industry, provide access to refining technology, offer workforce training, and enable entry into international markets - all within a framework of mutual interdependence that reduces risks.

The above scenario has been simplified to highlight elements for reflection and intervention mechanisms. It does not account for various factors, such as the political or economic stability of the DRC, the evolution of nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) EV batteries, or other applications of cobalt that will influence market demand. The scenario assumes that the EU’s demand for cobalt will grow to 108,000 metric tons by 2030, as forecasted by the EU Commission's Joint Research Centre in 2018.

With relatively similar economic and industrial situations, this model can also be applied to Zimbabwe’s lithium sector, assuming a prior normalization of relations between the EU and Zimbabwe.

Given the significant economies of scale required for CRM refining and processing, this scenario can only be replicated in countries with substantial mining reserves, operations, and output that can offset the considerable capital costs.

Conclusion and Final Considerations

Trilateral cooperation between China, the EU, and Africa regarding critical minerals is far from assured, particularly in the current geopolitical context, which has been complicated by Russia’s war in Ukraine and the trade war with China. The incentives for stakeholders to prioritize such cooperation are weak. In fact, geopolitical competition tends to incentivize bilateral cooperation over trilateral arrangements.

If cooperation is to be achieved, it must overcome several hurdles and establish an ad hoc mechanism that provides predictability and guarantees for stakeholders.

First, it must consider the complexity of the critical minerals supply chain, characterized by high segmentation and low vertical integration, as well as the asymmetry in the political and economic profiles of the three parties. This understanding is essential for creating an innovative cooperation framework that offers strong incentives for stakeholders to engage. The depicted scenario highlights the need for specific political, legal, and economic mechanisms.

Second, the duration of this cooperation – within the context of the EU's time-bound objective to decouple from China – presents potential challenges. The EU's defined time horizon could deter partners who do not share the same urgency in decoupling from each other and whose industrial and economic needs are oriented toward a longer-term perspective. This uncertainty could undermine confidence in the EU's commitment. Pursuing trilateral cooperation may require a reevaluation of the EU's approach to its relations with China.

In terms of recommendations, as the scenario suggests, the success of this type of cooperation will depend, among other factors, on a trilateral public-private agreement – comprising of governments, public entities and private sector – in which the parties commit to deploying the political, economic and legal tools necessary for this cooperation to succeed.

The MoUs between the EU and African countries on CRM, along with China’s commitment at FOCAC to collaborate with African nations on developing local processing capabilities, demonstrate that governmental cooperation is both possible and already in progress.

With Africa at the center of this discussion and recognizing the potential benefits of such cooperation, it will be up to the producing countries in Africa to take the lead in initiating this collaboration, positioning themselves as a solution that simultaneously addresses the needs of both China and Europe.

Ultimately, the prospect of trilateral cooperation hinges on Africa's willingness to embrace it and its capacity to manage the complexities inherent in what could be an ad hoc and innovative cooperation model.

Endnotes

About the author

Christian Géraud Neema

Christian Géraud Neema Byamungu is an analyst, observer, and researcher of China-Africa relations. He is a graduate of Renmin University of China and holds a master's degree in international development from the International University of Japan.

This short analysis is funded by the Stiftung Mercator Foundation as part of the Geopolitics and Geoeconomics of Africa-Europe Relations Project.