Following COP30 in Belém, Africa has a narrow window to deliver on technology justice, but only if it can secure predictable finance and steer the Belém Technology Implementation Programme toward co‑development rather than more promises.
At COP30 in Belém, Parties adopted the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP), decided to extend the term and revise the functions of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC) and agreed to develop a UNFCCC Just Transition Mechanism (JTM). Together, these arguably constitute the largest package of operationally explicit institutional changes to UNFCCC technology cooperation since the Technology Mechanism was established at COP16 in 2010.
For African countries, these shifts open a narrow but critical window to shape how multilateral technology cooperation is financed, governed and implemented, in line with their rights under Article 4.5 of the Convention.
The success of the Technology Implementation Programme (TIP) in aligning technology support with national priorities is contingent on several critical factors. These include scaled concessional finance, strengthened National Designated Entities, and the establishment of measurable indicators for technology justice. Most importantly, it depends on the political will among developed countries to implement their obligations under Article 4.5 of the Convention, which requires them to 'take all practicable steps' to promote, facilitate, and finance technology transfer.
Without these, TIP risks becoming another process‑heavy cycle that reinforces import dependence and leaves structural constraints intact.
The 2026-2028 period will shape whether African stakeholders can leverage TIP, the revamped CTC and the emerging JTM to build domestic innovation systems, shape governance arrangements and secure development gains.
COP30 in Belém adopted the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP). It also extended the term and revised the functions of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC). Together with the decision to develop the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), these mark an institutional shift toward implementation and will help determine who sets the terms of green innovation, who owns it and who benefits within UN processes. African stakeholders, who have long underscored that technology transfer is a core UNFCCC obligation rather than a discretionary development add‑on. For them, the post-Belém question is whether this new architecture can mobilise finance and partnerships for just, outcome‑oriented innovation or whether it will produce another cycle of pilots and promises.
Technology has been contested under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since the 1990s. Article 4.5 of the Convention commits developed countries to take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance technology development and transfer. A language that, while qualified, has been consistently interpreted by developing countries as establishing a substantive obligation. After COP16 in Cancún in 2010, Parties institutionalised cooperation through the Technology Mechanism, which consists of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre (CTCN). In 2018, Parties adopted the Technology Framework under Article 10, which organises the Mechanism’s work into five themes, namely innovation, implementation, enabling environment and capacity building, collaboration and stakeholder engagement, and support. The balance among these themes has remained politically sensitive. Many developing countries view the emphasis on enabling environments as a de facto precondition that shifts responsibility onto recipients to reform regulations, strengthen intellectual property regimes and reduce investment risk. At the same time, the scale and terms of access to finance and technology remain largely at donor discretion.
In practice, technology support delivered through the Technology Mechanism, especially via the CTCN and Technology Needs Assessments (TNAs), has concentrated on upstream functions such as assessments, roadmaps, capacity building, tools, and matchmaking. The Mechanism has had a limited mandate and has lacked resources for downstream scale-up, manufacturing and the building of sustained national technology capabilities. The first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism found that technical assistance projects "generally lack follow-up activities," that the Mechanism's transformational role was constrained by "limited resources," and that systemic national innovation infrastructure gaps were "beyond the mandate of the TEC and the CTCN. Progress has often stalled around intellectual property concerns, enabling environment conditionalities, and the absence of predictable, scaled support aligned with developing country priorities. At COP27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Parties recognised persistent gaps in technology transfer and resourcing for the Technology Mechanism, welcomed the first joint work programme of the TEC and CTCN for 2023 to 2027, and called for enhanced and sustainable support.
After the first global stocktake in 2023, African Parties continued to argue that the Technology Mechanism’s outputs, dialogues, guidance and small projects had still not shifted deeper constraints and that technology cooperation remained insufficient and weakly linked to finance. Subsequent decisions at COP28 and COP29 also continued to acknowledge the weak linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism and the persistent challenges in translating TNAs and Technology Action Plans into funded projects. From an African vantage point, this was not enough.
At the same time, debates on the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), established at COP27 and operationalised at COP28 as the UAE Just Transition Work Programme, began to intersect more visibly with discussions on technology. For African stakeholders, the JTWP’s growing attention to ownership and benefits of climate technologies opened a strategic space to connect just transition debates to longstanding technology justice concerns.
Finally, at COP30/CMA7 in Belém, Parties adopted the Belém Technology Implementation Programme (TIP). Through parallel COP and CMA decisions on the CTC, the core institutional component of the CTCN, the Parties agreed to extend its term through 2041 and revise its functions. They also launched a host selection process for the CTC; the call for proposals was issued in January 2026 and proposals are due by March 2026, with a decision expected at COP31.
TIP is the most explicit implementation-oriented mandate to date under the Technology Mechanism. TIP is also explicitly linked to the UNFCCC assessment architecture. The periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism is already mandated to feed into the Global Stocktake. TIP introduces a more organised approach to implementation and accountability. This involves conducting time-bound dialogues, producing annual joint TEC/CTCN reports, applying transparent monitoring and evaluation methods, and ensuring that TIP progress and outcomes reported in these joint yearly reports are used as inputs for future periodic reviews and global stocktakes. At the same time, the adopted text is less prescriptive than earlier draft language on indicator specificity. An earlier draft used the stronger formulation "monitoring and evaluation indicators" and included a request for SBSTA to elaborate on those indicators. The final adopted text uses "methodologies," which mandates rigorous and transparent assessment but leaves the definition of specific outcome indicators to future processes rather than assigning that task to any particular body. This “softening” makes it all the more important that African stakeholders shape what gets measured by proposing specific indicators through the TIP submissions process.
The TIP objectives are designed to address gaps identified in the first periodic assessment, particularly the conclusion that support has been insufficient, fragmented, and poorly linked to finance. TIP formally aligns support with TNAs, Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and Long-Term Low-Emission Development Strategies (LT-LEDS). This formal tethering of technology cooperation to instruments that guide budget allocation, donor coordination, and political accountability is vital. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of this alignment is directly dependent on the quality of these instruments. TIP is designed to end the long-standing disconnect in which technology support operated in a silo and was driven by supply-side matchmaking rather than by the priorities governments have already committed to in their own plans.
TIP requires the TEC and CTCN to integrate TIP activities into their workplans and to report annually to the CMA. Beginning in 2027, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) will host annual global technology dialogues as part of the TIP. These will be complemented by global in-session dialogues organised by the TEC/CTCN (together with the secretariat and partners) during the SBI's first session each year. Additionally, the CTCN will conduct regional dialogues through its forums, subject to resource availability. Together, these convenings turn what were previously ad hoc exchanges into a standing SBI process structured around priority themes and the periodic assessment cycle. Used strategically, this could give African negotiators a predictable forum to highlight implementation gaps and scrutinise where support is actually flowing, rather than having to fight for limited agenda space at each COP. TIP also establishes two important political milestones: a high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer at CMA10 in November 2028 and a formal review of the programme at CMA16 in 2034, informed by the third global stocktake. Because implementation begins immediately after CMA7, the 2026-2028 phase will be especially consequential, with interim accountability provided through annual TEC/CTCN reporting and the global dialogues starting in 2027.
In parallel, Parties updated the CTC’s term and institutional arrangements. The revised criteria emphasise the ability to mobilise more funding and strengthen cooperation with the Financial Mechanism. This matters for African countries, which account for nearly half of all CTCN technical assistance requests and where many National Designated Entities (NDEs) still struggle to turn priorities into fundable projects.
Finally, COP30 advanced the JTWP by agreeing to develop a Just Transition Mechanism (JTM, often referred to as the Belém Action Mechanism). The JTM’s scope treats just transition as cross-cutting across mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, reflecting a ‘whole-of-economy’ and ‘whole-of-society’ vision. While operational details remain under negotiation, the Subsidiary Bodies have been tasked with recommending a draft decision on the JTM’s operationalisation by June 2026, with adoption expected at COP31. This provides African countries with a short but important window to influence the JTM’s direction and ensure that just transition support reflects their national priorities and socioeconomic contexts, rather than adding another layer of bureaucratic competition.
TIP's ability to deliver tangible results will mostly depend on financing. However, COP30 did not create a dedicated TIP funding channel and instead relies on voluntary contributions through existing institutions. This avoids creating a new dedicated window but risks finance continuing to favour bigger emerging economies. Even under optimistic scenarios, developed countries remain far from the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) floor of US$300 billion per year by 2035, alongside a broader ambition to mobilise US$1.3 trillion per year by 2035, underscoring that the scale and predictability of concessional finance remain the binding constraint. Most international climate finance to Africa is delivered as loans rather than grants, and the NCQG discussions emphasise ‘mobilising’ and ‘leveraging’ finance in ways that typically might expand the use of loan‑based instruments. However, many African countries are already in or near debt distress. In several of Africa's largest economies, debt service absorbs over half of government revenue. This severely constrains fiscal space for technology and social investment. For countries already facing high debt-service burdens, additional borrowing increases future repayment obligations and can crowd out the very revenue needed for technology development. This creates structural tension for TIP, which aims to strengthen national innovation systems in countries whose fiscal space is already constrained due to high debt‑service costs. Unless TIP is paired with scaled, predictable, grant‑rich support and with debt‑relief or fiscal‑space measures for high‑burden countries, its outcomes will likely reflect today’s pattern of uneven access rather than the programme’s aim to accelerate broad‑based technology implementation.
A further risk is that Belém did not resolve long-standing political disputes over intellectual property and the balance between technology transfer and enabling environments. These issues will continue to determine whether the new system delivers.
Looking ahead, much will hinge on early implementation steps between 2026 and 2028. During this period, Parties will select a new host for the CTC, design the annual global and regional technology dialogues that begin in 2027 and begin feeding early TIP outputs into the periodic assessment cycle. This gives African countries and Africa‑based organisations a short but important political window to influence host arrangements, dialogue agendas and assessment inputs so that scarce resources flow toward national innovation systems and concrete project pipelines. African institutions are eligible to host the CTC, and some may have the necessary technical and fiduciary capacity — but many would likely need to bid as a consortium. On paper, any institution that meets the criteria can host the CTC. In practice, however, the requirements for sustained co‑financing, financial stability and global partnerships mean that the main constraints are political and institutional, not formal eligibility. As a result, African contenders will need strong regional backing and international partnerships to succeed.
Among the conversations and actions which are expected to deepen in the run-up to COP31, three priorities should stand for African stakeholders:
16 March 2026 — CTC host proposals due
Proposals to host the CTC secretariat are due by the 16th. The evaluation panel reports to SBI64 in June 2026 and a hosting decision is expected at COP31.
Task: The African Group should determine its host strategy before the deadline. An African or consortium bid requires a credible institutional governance structure, a CTCN management plan and secured co-financing commitments. Where an African bid is not advanced, the Group should use the evaluation and SBI64 process to press for explicit, reportable commitments from competing proponents on programming responsiveness to African NDE priorities, staffing composition and the depth of regional delivery arrangements.
June 2026 — SB64, Bonn
The Subsidiary Bodies will recommend draft decisions on both the JTM operationalisation process and the CTC host.
Task: The African Group should submit JTM text options at SB64 that clearly clarify complementarity with TIP and the Santiago Network. The proposed text should address the JTM's relationship to the Financial Mechanism, including criteria for a dedicated or ring-fenced finance window. The text should also define clear, measurable criteria for what "operationalisation" entails in practice, distinguishing between procedural operationalisation (establishing bodies and workplans) and substantive operationalisation (delivering finance and implementation support at scale). Procedurally, the AGN should submit this text as a formal Party submission before SB64, coordinate co-sponsorship with the LDC Group and AOSIS to build a negotiating coalition, and identify specific AGN lead negotiators for the JTM and TIP agenda items to ensure continuity between the submission and the negotiations.
1 July 2026 — First TIP topic submissions deadline (TIP para. 12)
Parties and observers are invited to propose priority themes for the 2027 global in-session dialogue under TIP. This annual submission cycle begins in 2026.
Task: The African Group should submit a consolidated topic package by 1 July 2026, reflecting aggregated NDE priorities from member states. To facilitate this, the AGN Secretariat, with AUDA-NEPAD and UNECA, should hold a virtual NDE consultation before mid-June 2026 to gather priority themes from willing members. If full aggregation isn't possible within the timeframe, submissions should be based on documented AGN positions from SB62 and pre-COP30, with a commitment to deepen NDE consultations before 2027. Proposed themes should focus on strengthening domestic innovation and research; measurable technology-justice indicators linked to development; structural barriers, such as IP regimes, the enabling environment, and financing terms, that hinder technology cooperation; and criteria for assessing the CTC's new host organisation against NDE responsiveness.
November 2026 — COP31/CMA8, Antalya
COP31 is expected to deliver the CTC host decision, the JTM operationalisation pathway and the first JTWP effectiveness review. Together, these will substantially determine the institutional landscape for TIP through the end of the decade.
Task: The African Group should ensure all three COP31 outcomes—the CTC host decision, the JTM operationalisation pathway, and the JTWP effectiveness review—reflect priorities secured during 2026 rather than deferring substance to later sessions. This requires: submitting proposed decision text on the JTM and the JTWP review at SB64 in June 2026; securing co-sponsorship of key text with the LDC Group, AOSIS, and G-77/China members before Antalya; engaging African finance ministers and heads of delegation early; and treating any deferral of the JTM or CTC decision beyond COP31 as unacceptable, since both were tasked to conclude this session.
2027 — First TIP global and regional dialogues
Annual global dialogues begin at the first SBI session (TIP para. 11); CTCN regional dialogues begin subject to available resources (para. 16).
Task: NDEs and line ministries should present aggregated multi-country programmatic proposals supported by implementation evidence on finance gaps, time-to-support and local value addition, building a structured record that feeds into TEC/CTCN annual reporting under paragraph 25.
November 2028 — CMA10. First ministerial stocktake of TIP (para. 15)
The first high-level ministerial dialogue on technology development and transfer is the political checkpoint at which TIP's early performance will be judged.
Task: African stakeholders should arrive with a documented evidence base of outcomes and shortfalls from TIP's first two years. The narrative set at CMA10 will frame the second global stocktake cycle and the formal TIP review at CMA16 in 2034.
Source: Author’s Construct, 2025.
TIP, the extended CTC term and the emerging JTM together open new formal entry points for a more responsive system. However, architecture alone does not shift power. Over three decades, climate‑technology cooperation has not shifted higher‑value segments of global value chains toward African countries. Each reform cycle has produced more complex procedural structures without changing the fundamental conditions, such as IP regimes, financing terms, and industrial policy constraints that determine where value is captured.
TIP is unlikely to change this pattern without addressing structural constraints.
African countries need the right to pursue an industrial strategy with concessional and grant finance at the scale needed for economic transformation (not incremental loans that deepen debt distress), IP rules that genuinely enable technology sharing and Northern implementation of Article 4.5 obligations. None of these is currently fully on offer through the UNFCCC, which is why technology transfer rhetoric has outpaced reality for so long. That doesn't mean abandoning multilateral processes, which remain one of the only inclusive forums for these negotiations. Instead, it requires a clear-eyed assessment of what the UNFCCC can and cannot deliver, and a strategic distribution of African political energy across multiple arenas, such as bilateral negotiations, regional integration, and South-South cooperation. African leverage is often greater in these arenas than within UNFCCC plenary processes, where procedural norms favour consensus and developed countries retain agenda-setting power.
Early TIP implementation will set patterns that are difficult to change later, which is why the 2026-2028 window is so vital for African negotiators and institutions. Whether the priorities identified in this paper (i.e., using TIP for co-development rather than import dependence, connecting technology decisions to just transition governance, and defining measurable justice indicators) translate into outcomes will depend on formal participation in TIP‑related dialogues and coalition-building around specific asks. Also crucial will be how African governments, negotiators, firms, researchers and communities organise politically within the constraints of uneven capacity and structural asymmetries. African stakeholders will need to prioritise political coalition mobilisation within and beyond the UNFCCC, build disciplined coalitions with the G77, AOSIS, and LDC Group capable of securing substantive concessions rather than procedural gains, and use bilateral leverage to obtain better multilateral terms. Equally important is institutional honesty; African governments and negotiators must be willing to state clearly, in public and in formal submissions, when the UNFCCC process is fulfilling its technology obligations and when it is not, replacing diplomatic ambiguity with documented accountability.
Dr. Serwah Prempeh is the Senior Fellow and Head of APRI's Just Green Technology Transition Programme, which is focused on aligning African technology innovation priorities with its development goals and bridging Africa-Germany-EU relations on just green technology innovation and development.
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