Afrika läuft Gefahr, die Fehler der Vergangenheit auf den Kohlenstoffmärkten zu wiederholen. Wird es weiterhin als Lieferant kostengünstiger Emissionszertifikate fungieren oder die souveräne Kontrolle beanspruchen, um seine eigene klimatische und wirtschaftliche Zukunft zu gestalten?
Foto von micheile henderson auf Unsplash
Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement establishes a centralised, UN-supervised market mechanism that succeeds the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It aims to create a global carbon market for issuing and trading credits, known as Article 6.4 Emission Reductions (A6.4ERs), which are tracked in a central UN registry overseen by a supervisory body. The mechanism has decisively moved from negotiation to early-stage implementation, with key operational components now completed or under development:
Host countries may authorise A6.4ERs for various uses, including for other countries’ NDCs or for international mitigation purposes (e.g., CORSIA). Once a credit is authorised for international use, it is subject to a corresponding adjustment (CA), an accounting process that ensures the emission reduction is counted only once by the buyer, not by the host/issuing country. This operationalisation signals that the era of preparation is over; the era of execution has begun.1
Parallel to the multilateral Article 6.4, Article 6.2 facilitates bilateral and plurilateral ‘cooperative approaches’ between countries to trade internationally-transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs). This track has served as a critical proving ground, allowing nations to gain hands-on experience with the foundational elements of international carbon trading.
The landmark Switzerland-Ghana agreement under Article 6.2 has provided African institutions with a real-world stress test of the required institutional plumbing.2 Through this and other emerging partnerships (e.g., with Singapore), nations like Ghana and Rwanda have trialled the development of letters of authorisation (LOAs), the application of corresponding adjustments and the establishment of interoperable registries. The lessons from Article 6.2 pilots are directly transferable, significantly lowering the barrier to entry for participation in the more complex Article 6.4.
The sophistication of the Article 6 rulebook masks a simple, underlying tension between two competing philosophies for market engagement: export or domestic use. In practice, these represent a spectrum countries can traverse as their capabilities improve.
Africa's historical experience with carbon markets was defined by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), where its participation was marginal (≤2% of projects).3 This legacy cemented an export-oriented ‘Kyoto mindset’, where the primary objective is to generate and sell (low-cost) credits to foreign buyers. This reflex is reinforced by several factors:
The consequence is a price asymmetry. As former African Development Bank (AfDB) President Akinwunmi Adesina warned, African credits have been offered at prices as low as USD 1-3 per tonne (USD 1-3/t), a fraction of their value in compliance markets, creating a high risk of exploitative ‘carbon grabs’.4
The Paris Agreement needs a fundamental shift. Its architecture of registries, authorisation and corresponding adjustments (CAs) is explicitly designed to empower countries to manage their own decarbonisation paths.5 A ‘Paris mindset’ reframes carbon markets as a sovereign tool for delivering a country's own NDC first,via domestic compliance markets, by shifting focus from international offsetting to national climate ambition and policy integration.
In this model, the domestic use of credits is the priority, whether for compliance with a national carbon tax or to meet sectoral targets. The authorisation of credits for export becomes a strategic policy choice to generate additional finance from a calculated surplus, not the default monetisation route. This approach ensures that the primary benefits of environmental, social and economic mitigation activities are retained in-country, building a coalition for climate action. The experience of some Global South nations, which have in the past cancelled credits to meet their own targets, serves as a powerful precedent for this sovereign-first approach.
Readiness is not a binary state; it is the deliberate construction of institutions that serve a sovereign, NDC-first vision. Based on the West African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance,6 I have defined five interdependent pillars to establish readiness.
| Pillar | Readiness test | African examples | Gaps/risks |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Policy & Institutions | DNA legally empowered; national 6.4 strategy | Ghana Carbon Market Office; Kenya Climate Change (Amend.) Act 2023 | Many countries lack enabling laws |
| 2. Registry & MRV | National registry interoperable with UN registry | Ghana Carbon Registry (GCR); Kenya registry mandated in 2024 regs | Fragmented or manual systems |
| 3. Authorisation & CAs | LOA templates; annual CA reporting | Rwanda’s first CA (Gold Standard 2023) | Few nations have CA workflows |
| 4. Safeguards & Benefit-share | SD tool domesticated; statutory revenue share | Kenya 40%/25% rule; SB grievance channel | Enforcement & free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) capacity |
| 5. Finance & Market Access | Access to concessional finance & exchanges | AfDB Carbon Support Facility (AfDB 2025b); Egyptian Exchange (EGX) carbon board | Price asymmetry, limited liquidity |
African nations are already choosing their paths, creating a diverse landscape of action, ambition and strategy.
| Feature / Country | South Africa | Kenya | Ghana | Rwanda | Nigeria | Egypt | Morocco |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pillar 1: Policy | Operating carbon tax | Framework adopted (Climate Change [Carbon Markets] Regulations, 2024) | Framework adopted (Carbon Market Office [CMO]) | Framework adopted (National Carbon Market Framework [NCMF]) | Emerging CCA-2021 & Carbon Market Activation Policy (CMAP) | Regulated VCM on Egyptian Exchange (EGX) | Emerging (CBAM-driven) |
| Pillar 2: Registry | Domestic system | Mandated (2024), being digitised | Ongoing operationalisation (Ghana Carbon Registry [GCR]) | Planned (2025) | Planned (2025) | System for EGX | Planned |
| Pillar 3: Authorisation / CA | In development | Rules in place (2024) | Operational procedures | Demonstrated (2023) | Rules in draft | In development | In development |
| Pillar 4: Benefits | N/A (domestic) | Yes (40% / 25% share) | In policy discussion | In policy discussion | Rules in draft | N/A | N/A |
| Pillar 5: Finance | Domestic market liquidity | Seeking strategic partners | Bilateral A6.2 deals | Bilateral A6.2 deals | Seeking foreign direct investment (FDI) | Domestic exchange trading | Trade-driven investment |
| Dominant mindset | Paris (domestic) | Hybrid (pivoting to Paris) | Kyoto (export-led) | Kyoto (export-led) | Hybrid | Paris (domestic) | Paris (trade-driven) |
Readiness is fraught with risks requiring proactive management and institutional capacity:
The question is no longer whether Africa is ready for Article 6.4. The rules are taking shape. Yet, although institutional capacity is growing in some countries, it remains under-developed in many others. The real question is: Are individual African countries ready to lead by developing their domestic markets? True readiness lies in the confident choice to prioritise the domestic good and use the global market as a tool, rather than being subject to its movements.
To execute a decisive pivot, African regulators should focus on the following actions:
By embedding Article 6.4 within a robust national strategy, African countries can pivot from being participants in a market designed elsewhere to fulfilling their potential as protagonists shaping a climate-resilient future of their own making.
[1] UNFCCC. (n.d.). Paris Agreement crediting mechanism. United Nations Climate Change.
[2] Klik Foundation. (2025, July 7). Ghana and Switzerland pioneer Africa’s first ITMO issuance under Paris Agreement's Article 6.2 for NDC use.
[3] UNCTAD. (2024). Trade and development report 2023. Chapter VI: The need for financial reform for climate-aligned development. United Nations.
[4] Pilling, D. (2025, April 5). ‘Carbon grab’ replacing ‘land grab’ in Africa. Financial Times.
[5] UNEP-CCC. (2016). Understanding the Paris Agreement: analysing the reporting requirements under the enhanced transparency framework.
[6] West African Alliance on Carbon Markets and Climate Finance. (2022). Article 6 readiness blueprint. Perspectives Climate Group.
[7] Environmental Protection Agency Ghana. (n.d.). The Ghana Carbon Registry. Government of Ghana.
[8] Gold Standard. (2023). Beyond national commitments: Rwanda, atmosfair and Gold Standard launch first carbon credit aligned with Paris Article 6. Gold Standard.
[9] Republic of Kenya. (2024). The Climate Change (carbon markets) Regulations, 2024. Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 126, Legislative Supplement No. 81. Government Printer.
[10] Miriri, D. (2025, May 29). African Development Bank to launch carbon credits support facility. Reuters.
[11] National Treasury, Republic of South Africa. (2024). Carbon tax discussion paper. Republic of South Africa.
[12] Baker McKenzie. (2024, August 29). Egypt: unlocking opportunities – navigating Egypt’s new carbon trading regulations
[13] Republic of Kenya. (2024). The Climate Change (Carbon Markets) Regulations, 2024. Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 126, Legislative Supplement No. 81. Government Printer.
[14] Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2021). Climate Change Act, 2021. Federal Government of Nigeria.
[15] Pilling, D. (2025, April 5). ‘Carbon grab’ replacing ‘land grab’ in Africa. Financial Times.
Ebipere K. Clark, Managing Partner at Frontier-Alpha LLP, is a seasoned consultant in capital markets, energy, infrastructure, climate policy & finance. Former Special Adviser to CBN Governor & Technical Adviser to InfraCorp CEO.