COP31 Energie, Sicherheit, Nigeria, Energiewende, Elektrifizierung (EN)

Klimaziele der COP31 wie die JETPs stützen sich in hohem Maße auf Kredite, was die Schuldenlast der Entwicklungsländer potenziell erhöhen könnte. Die afrikanischen Länder müssen Transparenz einfordern und „transaktionale Führungsstärke“ zeigen, um produktive Volkswirtschaften aufzubauen.

 COP31 Energie, Sicherheit, Nigeria, Energiewende, Elektrifizierung (EN)

Foto von Silvere Meya auf Pexels.com

Unter Richard Calland
Published on Nov 19, 2026
Summary
  • Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), such as those in South Africa and Senegal, often feature high headline pledge numbers that obscure a heavy reliance on loans rather than grants.
  • Without rigorous negotiation and favourable financial terms, such as concessionality, tenors and interest rates, climate finance could exacerbate the debt burden of developing nations.
  • Appropriate financing instruments must match the economic realities of transition activities, directing scarce grant funding toward non-revenue-generating social protections, reskilling and capacity building.
  • Ahead of COP31, African countries must exercise ‘transactional leadership’ to demand radical transparency and ensure that climate finance builds productive domestic economies rather than reproducing old global divisions of labour.

First there was the euphoria: COP26 in Glasgow 2021 and the grand announcement of a long-term political agreement between South Africa and an International Partners Group (IPG) consisting of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany and the European Union. The agreement included a USD 8.5bn pledge to support South Africa’s acceleration away from a coal-based energy system, and was heralded as a landmark climate finance deal that would take a new approach to blended finance. Aimed at climate-target-related development priorities, it was seen as a prototype for the concept of ‘country platforms’ that has since gathered momentum.

But what came next sends a salutary message that should be heeded in the run-up to COP31. Within a few weeks after COP26, a British cabinet minister called the UK High Commissioner in Pretoria to ask ‘how many coal plants have they [South Africa] closed?’ – an absurdly unrealistic understanding of the time of the relevant timeframe.1 The November 2021 declaration establishing the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) was deliberately loosely phrased in terms of the precise time it would take to put in place such a complex transaction and transition process. The IPG committed to mobilise approximately USD 8.5bn over three to five years, subject to agreement on the investment framework and the terms of the finance. The instruments might include grants, concessional loans, guarantees, private investment and technical assistance. It did not specify the grant-loan proportions, interest rates, maturities or allocation among IPG members.

Thanks to President Cyril Ramaphosa’s political leadership and the nimble-footed work of the Presidential Climate Commission, which commenced work in 2021, a Just Energy Transition framework was rapidly put in place to guide the process and to define the normative guardrails. Then came the real work on the climate finance deal. An experienced banker, Daniel Mminele, was brought in from the private sector to head a special unit in the Presidency – the Presidential Climate Finance Task Team (PCFTT) – to negotiate the detailed structure of the finance with the IPG partners. His mandate was to advise Cabinet on the ‘composition, affordability [and] alignment with our regulatory environment’.

It was hard going. Periodically, Mminele revealed his primary concern, which was that loan terms needed to be more attractive than the financing South Africa could obtain itself in capital markets, without excessively burdensome reporting requirements. Mminele’s team sought to apply four tests: affordability, concessionality relative to South Africa’s market borrowing cost, the implications for the national fiscus and the suitability of instruments for different transition expenditures.2 The PCFTT also raised concerns about strict conditions, reporting burdens and double counting.

Mminele’s negotiations yielded a Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP), from which one can discern its final breakdown3:

Table: Composition of the IPG’s USD 8.5bn pledge
Instrument Approx. amount (USD) Share
Grants/technical assistance 329.7m 3.9%
Concessional loans 5.325bn 63.0%
Commercial loans 1.5bn 17.7%
Guarantees 1.3bn 15.4%

Source: UK government

There is some evidence that Mminele and his team managed to improve the transaction during the course of their year of negotiations. A document leaked in October 2022 criticised the emerging composition of the package – which, according to the leak, had the grant element at just 2.7%. Mminele rejected the leak, saying it was out of date. Indeed, the final package announced a few weeks later set grants at just short of 4%. Concessional loans rose from 54% of the package in the leaked draft to 63%, while commercial loans and guarantees fell from 43% to 33%. This suggests that the negotiations yielded some modest gains – on the share of concessional finance as well as grants.

And there is a wider point about sovereignty. The final JET-IP had a very different bottom line: USD 98bn. This was the price tag that South Africa itself calculated for the priorities that it chose for its just energy transition – essentially threefold: electricity transmission as well as decommissioning coal plants; electric vehicles; and green hydrogen. This is important in the context of country investment platforms, where the overarching purpose is to design a blended finance mechanism that will close the transaction gap – that is to say the gap between the finance needs of the particular project or projects and the capital available for investment in them – by aligning finance with country-owned strategic economic development priorities.

South Africa’s JETP is a useful case study in the gap between the finance mobilised and the fiscal burden taken on. Senegal has a similar story to tell. Its JETP was announced in 2023 with international partners committing EUR 2.5bn over an initial three-to-five-year period to support Senegal’s ambition to raise renewables to 40% of installed electricity capacity by 2030, with a final investment need of around EUR 9.5bn. At around 6% of the overall package, the grant component was very similar to South Africa’s, and provoked similar concerns with domestic stakeholders.

But two distinctive points can be made about the Senegal experience. The first concerns opacity. Whereas in South Africa’s case there is relatively detailed information about the negotiating process, reflecting South Africa’s robust democratic culture, in the Senegalese case very little is known. The second acknowledges that the fiscal picture on which a deal is negotiated could turn out to be wrong. In 2023, Senegal’s public finances appeared relatively stable. In February 2025, however, the Court of Auditors found that debt at the end of 2023 stood at close to 100% of GDP, against the 74% previously reported, and the country now faces a major debt crisis.4 The EUR 1.74bn in concessional loans earmarked under the JETP would add to that burden.5 

Yet, we should avoid taking a simplistic view that all debt is bad. Concessional debt can be extremely valuable where it substitutes for more expensive borrowing. The real issue is therefore additionality and concessionality: What interest rate? What tenor? What grace period? In which currency? Who takes exchange-rate risk? Is there a sovereign guarantee? What would the borrower otherwise have paid? These questions tell you much more than whether an instrument has been labelled ‘concessional’.

There is another related issue to keep in mind. Some investments are more suitable for debt than others. Revenue-generating infrastructure can reasonably carry debt, for example. But a just transition also entails costs that do not readily produce bankable cash flows: worker reskilling, social protection, municipal transition, community development, institutional capacity, planning and support for communities losing coal-based livelihoods – as South Africa’s just energy transition has again shown.

As Mminele said of the grant component in a revealing interview in November 2022:

‘It’s just shy of 4% of the total package and, ideally, you would direct that to many of the “just” investments; investments that are geared towards making sure that some of the workers in the communities that are currently highly dependent on the fossil-fuel value chain, particularly the coal value chain, are protected and supported. In addition, investments that are not revenue generating would lend themselves to be funded in this way, such as policy development, proofs of concepts and some of the technology transfer and capacity building initiatives.’

Loading those expenditures onto sovereign debt is much harder to justify. In other words, the appropriate financing instrument should follow the economics of the transition activity, rather than the donor’s preferred financial instrument.

Carlos Lopes, former Executive Secretary of UNECA and now a professor at the University of Cape Town’s Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, argues that ‘Africa must negotiate for affordable funding that builds its industries, energy systems, transport, cities and skills – not simply ask for more money labelled “climate finance”. Climate finance should not be separated from development funding’.

The South African experience revealed that the politically salient number – the total pledged – was much less informative than its composition. That prompted an understandable concern: Why should an already indebted state borrow substantially more to accelerate a transition that is simultaneously a global decarbonisation imperative? A pledge may be a new burden in green wrapping. It will depend on the details: the composition of the package, the terms and conditions, the rate of concession, and so on. For African countries, this is about being savvy. It requires ‘transactional’ leadership – that is to say: the capability needed to negotiate skilfully and firmly, to secure, in this case, the fair deals needed for the credibility of country platforms.

The underpinning principle of international climate justice – that countries which contributed little or nothing to the cause of the global warming problem should nonetheless contribute to mitigation by transitioning away from fossil fuel energy systems and other carbon emissions with the financial support of the developed economies that did cause the problem – will be fundamentally undermined if the finance simply adds to an already grave indebtedness. As Lopes emphasises, ‘the measure of climate justice is not how much money is labelled ‘climate finance’, but whether it arrives affordably and helps Africa manufacture, trade and build its own productive economy. Otherwise, the just transition will be the old international division of labour powered by renewable energy’.

This should be at the forefront of climate diplomacy at COP31 in Antalya, where the Turkish presidency has made finance its main focus. Bearing in mind the Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T and the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance agreed at COP29, radical transparency must be the sine qua non of the negotiations that lie ahead. The new USD 300bn per year by 2035 may or may not be met, but what matters more than the quantum of the finance is the detail of the composition and the terms of deployment.

Endnotes

[1] Confidential interview with a senior official, February 2022.

[2] Author’s interviews with sources close to the process.

[3] Although it is worth noting that, over time, the composition of the international partnership, and its financial package, changed: The US abandoned the partnership, and new countries such as Spain and Canada joined it, increasing the pledge to over USD 14bn.

[4] The Court of Auditors put debt at the end of 2023 at 99.67% of GDP, against 74.41% previously reported, and the 2023 budget deficit at 12.3% of GDP against 4.9%. The IMF confirmed significant under-reporting of fiscal deficits and public debt for 2019-2023.

[5] According to Senegal's investment plan, concessional loans account for EUR 1,743 million (69.7%) of the EUR 2.5 billion financing package, while grants account for EUR 148 million (5.9%) (figures reproduced in Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, 2026). However, in October 2026, the German government informed the Bundestag that, to its knowledge, neither the European Commission nor the European Investment Bank had issued JETP loans to the Senegalese state.

About the Author
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Richard Calland

Richard Calland is Director of the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership Africa, which offers a Country Platform Leadership Support Programme. He is also Visiting Adjunct Professor at the University of Witwatersrand